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ARTICLES 
THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 
David A. Skeel, Jr.∗ 
ABSTRACT 
When the ascendancy of a new movement leaves a visible a mark on 
American politics and law, its footprints ordinarily can be traced through the 
pages of America’s law reviews.  But the influence of evangelicals and other 
theologically conservative Christians has been quite different.  Surveying the 
elite law review literature in 1976, the year Newsweek proclaimed as the 
“year of the evangelical,” one would not find a single scholarly legal article 
outlining a Christian perspective on law or any particular legal issue.  Even in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the literature remained remarkably thin.  By the 1990s, 
distinctively Christian scholarship had finally begun to emerge in a few areas.  
But even today, the scope of Christian legal scholarship is shockingly narrow 
for so nationally influential a movement. 
This Article argues that the strange trajectory of Christian legal 
scholarship can only be understood against the backdrop of the fraught 
relationship between religion and American higher education starting in the 
late nineteenth century.  As the nation’s modern research universities emerged 
in the 1870s, leading reformers began to promote nonsectarian, scientific 
approaches to scholarship.  These developments increasingly excluded 
religious perspectives.  But the disdain did not run in one direction only.  For 
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much of the twentieth century, American evangelicals absented themselves 
from American public life.  Theologically conservative Christians who 
remained in legal academia operated under cover, a stance reflected in the 
absence of Christian legal scholarship except on church-state issues, in the 
Catholic natural law tradition, and in a handful of other areas. 
The first half of the Article is devoted to this historical exegesis and to a 
survey of current Christian legal scholarship.  The Article then shifts from a 
critical to a more constructive mode, from telling to showing, as I attempt to 
illustrate what a normative, and then a descriptive, contemporary Christian 
legal scholarship might look like. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many evangelicals and other theologically conservative Christians,1 as 
for other Americans, the legal system is the solution of first resort for nearly 
every conceivable issue.  In the thirty-five years since Roe v. Wade,2 
theologically conservative Christians have continuously lobbied for state 
abortion restrictions and for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices who 
might prune or reverse the constitutional right to abortion.  They have pushed 
for restrictions on gay rights for much of this same period—at least since Anita 
Bryant, a singer best known for her commercials proclaiming that “a day 
without orange juice is like a day without sunshine,” headlined a campaign to 
overturn an antidiscrimination law in Dade County, Florida in the 1970s.  In 
2004, when the Florida state courts authorized Michael Schiavo to instruct 
Terri Schiavo’s doctors to remove her feeding tube, despite her parents’ 
objections, theologically conservative Christians pushed Congress to authorize 
the federal courts to intervene.  The penchant for legal and legislative solutions 
extends to less explosive issues, as well.  As crime rates surged in recent 
decades, theologically conservative Christians were among the biggest 
cheerleaders for tougher penalties and more aggressive law enforcement.  They 
have led the opposition to state casino and lottery legislation and the campaign 
to prohibit internet gambling.  Whatever the question, law seems to be the 
answer. 
If theologically conservative Christians were simply another voice crying 
in the wilderness, the calls for legal intervention would not be especially 
 
 1 The principal groups of theologically conservative Christians in the U.S. are Protestant evangelicals 
and theologically conservative Catholics.  This Article focuses most extensively on the role of evangelicals, 
but theologically conservative Catholics figure as well.  Less theologically conservative (“mainline”) 
Protestant Christian thought is also considered but figures less prominently for reasons discussed infra note 9 
and elsewhere.  After a long history of political and theological animus, evangelicals and conservative 
Catholics have joined forces on many issues in recent years.  Theologically, this trend is reflected in 
Evangelicals & Catholics Together, a series of documents produced by a group of prominent evangelicals and 
Catholics in the early 1990s.  See, e.g., Evangelicals & Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third 
Millennium, FIRST THINGS, May 1994, at 15; see also MARK A. NOLL & CAROLYN NYSTROM, IS THE 
REFORMATION OVER? AN EVANGELICAL ASSESSMENT OF CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLICISM (2005). 
The term evangelical, and the group it refers to, eludes precise definition.  The best-known definition is 
the four-part specification offered by British historian David Bebbington.  According to Bebbington, 
evangelicals are characterized by a commitment to (1) the authority of the Bible; (2) the cross (the belief that 
salvation is only possible through the atoning work of Jesus Christ); (3) conversion (a believer must, like 
Jimmy Carter, be “born again”); and (4) activism (in evangelism, missions and social work).  D.W. 
BEBBINGTON, EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN BRITAIN: A HISTORY FROM THE 1730S TO THE 1980S, at 2−3 
(1989). 
 2 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
SKEEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/12/2008  2:24:13 PM 
2008] CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1475 
noteworthy.  But both those who applaud and those who worry about them 
agree that theologically conservative Christians are more than simply another 
voice.  Most of the nation’s presidents since Jimmy Carter have identified 
themselves as evangelicals, none more explicitly than George W. Bush.  
Evangelicals regularly flex their political muscles, as in the Schiavo affair and 
with the “Justice Sundays” that they held in 2005 to pressure President Bush to 
nominate sympathetic judges to the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts.3 
When the ascendancy of a new legal movement leaves so visible a mark on 
American politics and law, its footprints ordinarily can be traced through the 
pages of America’s law reviews.  The usual pattern is profuse discussion in the 
scholarly literature, from which one or two celebrities emerge, attaining a 
visibility and influence that extends well beyond law school circles.  During 
the Progressive era, then-Boston lawyer Louis Brandeis and Harvard Law 
School Dean Roscoe Pound were known both for their scholarly articles and as 
leading national figures in the Progressive movement.4  Much of the legislation 
of the New Deal era was influenced by Legal Realism and by Legal Realists 
like William Douglas and Jerome Frank whose vision for an interdisciplinary 
approach to law had revolutionized legal scholarship.5  More recently, 
conservative legal scholars made the case for deregulation and for originalist 
approaches to constitutional interpretation in the academic literature and 
continued to debate these approaches in the law reviews as lawmakers and 
judges began to implement some of the principles.6 
 
 3 See, e.g., Letter from Tony Perkins, President, Family Research Council, Justice Sunday: Stop the 
Filibuster Against People of Faith (Apr. 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i= 
LH05D02 (open letter advocating Justice Sunday). 
 4 As a progressive lawyer in Boston, Brandeis was famous for briefs (now known as “Brandeis briefs”) 
that marshaled extensive sociological evidence in support of progressive litigation.  He coauthored the first law 
review article to identify and defend a right of privacy, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right 
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), and wrote a book excoriating the dominance of J.P. Morgan and a 
small group of other banks in American finance, see LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW 
THE BANKERS USE IT (1914).  Roscoe Pound was a leading advocate of “sociological” jurisprudence.  See, e.g., 
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 
(1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911). 
 5 The founding texts of legal realism include Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next 
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), and JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).  Classic 
histories are WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN & THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973), LAURA KALMAN, 
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927−1960 (1986), and JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). 
 6 Robert Bork’s law review articles and books transformed antitrust theory.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (book based on Bork’s earlier scholarship); 
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE 
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The theologically conservative Christian influence on recent American law 
is radically different.  Surveying the leading law reviews in 1976, the year 
Newsweek proclaimed as the “year of the evangelical,”7 one would not find a 
single article⎯not one⎯outlining a Christian perspective on law or any 
particular legal issue.  Even in the 1980s and 1990s, the literature remained 
remarkably thin.  By the 1990s, distinctively Christian legal scholarship had 
finally begun to emerge in a few areas.  But even today, the scope of Christian 
legal scholarship in the American legal literature is shockingly narrow for such 
a nationally influential movement.8  Why is there almost no trace of the 
intellectual underpinnings of the recent movement?9 
To some extent, theologically conservative Christians have piggybacked on 
other legal movements, especially conservative legal theory.  Many support 
deregulation, for instance, and favor original intent in Constitutional 
interpretation.10  Perhaps the theologically conservative Christian perspective 
is captured by these other movements.  But conservative legal thought is far 
too imperfect a proxy for this explanation to hold up.  Several of the signature 
Christian issues⎯such as abortion and gambling prohibition⎯figure very little 
in contemporary conservatism.  And to the extent the issues do figure, 
ideological conservatives and theologically conservative Christians often part 
ways.  An alternative explanation trades on American evangelicals’ reputation 
 
L.J. 373 (1966).  The interest of Justice Scalia and others in originalism and textualism draws on the work of 
predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 849 (1989); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1977). 
 7 Kenneth L. Woodward, The Year of the Evangelical, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1976, at 68, 68. 
 8 The statements in the text about the paucity of Christian legal scholarship are confirmed by an 
examination of the articles published in the leading law reviews from 1900 to 2000.  The study is described in 
note 39, infra. 
 9 Like the evangelicals and other theological conservatives that are the principal focus of this Article, the 
more theologically liberal mainline Protestants also have not produced a distinctive legal scholarship.  This is 
in part due to the developments discussed in Part I of this Article, but also because mainline Protestants have 
tended to adopt the secular language of the academy in their public engagement.  For an excellent analysis of 
the public role of contemporary mainline Protestants, see THE QUIET HAND OF GOD: FAITH-BASED ACTIVISM 
AND THE PUBLIC ROLE OF MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM (Robert Wuthnow & John H. Evans eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter QUIET HAND OF GOD].  For an impressive study of mainline Protestant influence on New Deal 
legislation, see Michael Janson, Liberal Protestantism and the New Deal (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author) 
 10 Originalism is standard fare in the Christian legal defense funds and other organizations that 
emphasize Christian perspectives on law.  The instruction provided at the Center for Christian Statesmanship, 
an institute for politics and religion in Washington DC, and in the educational programs run by the Alliance 
Defense Fund, for instance, relies heavily on originalism. 
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for anti-intellectualism.11  Perhaps evangelicals, as a slew of recent books and 
articles darkly suggest, systematically discourage scholarly inquiry.12  This 
explanation is closer to the mark, but it begs more questions than it answers.  
How, for instance, can the charge of anti-intellectualism be squared with the 
recent proliferation of Christian think tanks, legal defense funds, and law 
schools?  And to describe evangelicals as anti-intellectual doesn’t explain 
when this tendency emerged, and why.  Nor does it explain the absence of 
Catholic legal scholarship in the leading law reviews for most of the twentieth 
century. 
Only against the backdrop of the fraught relationship between religion and 
American higher education starting in the late nineteenth century can we fully 
make sense of the strange trajectory of Christian legal scholarship.  As the 
nation’s modern research universities emerged in the 1870s, leading reformers 
began to promote nonsectarian, scientific approaches to scholarship.  Although 
many of the reformers were themselves (liberal Protestant) Christians, their 
reforms increasingly excluded religion from universities and law schools 
altogether.  Within a few decades, these trends hardened into an aversion to 
religion in scholarly discourse that lingered well into the twentieth century. 
The absence of Christian legal scholarship, especially evangelical legal 
scholarship, cannot simply be chalked up to secular hostility, however.  After 
campaigning for one social cause after another in the nineteenth century, from 
abolition to Sunday closing laws,13 American evangelicals absented themselves 
from American public life for much of the twentieth.  Starting in roughly 1925, 
the year of the Scopes “monkey” trial and the death of populist evangelical 
William Jennings Bryan, evangelicals’ “optimistic prospects for reform and 
[their] support for activist government,” according to a prominent religious 
historian, “gave way to cultural pessimism and a fear of governmental 
encroachment.  Concern for political involvement was replaced with an almost 
 
 11 This indictment was most famously leveled in RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 55−144 (1963).  For a recent reiteration, see, for example, Franklin Foer, Brain Trust, NEW 
REPUB., Nov. 14, 2005, at 6, 6 (suggesting that “[e]vangelicals supply the political energy [in religious right 
politics], Catholics the intellectual heft”). 
 12 Books and articles raising concerns about American evangelicals on these and other grounds include 
Foer, supra note 11; Damon Linker, Without a Doubt: A Catholic Priest, a Pious President and the 
Christianizing of America, NEW REPUB., Apr. 3, 2006, at 25; RANDALL BALMER, THY KINGDOM COME: HOW 
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT DISTORTS THE FAITH AND THREATENS AMERICA⎯AN EVANGELICAL’S LAMENT (2006); 
MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM (2006). 
 13 For a useful history of these efforts, see GAINES M. FOSTER, MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN 
LOBBYISTS AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865−1920 (2002). 
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exclusive focus on personal evangelism and personal piety.”14  Not until the 
1970s did evangelical re-engagement with American culture begin in earnest.  
Only then, as Newsweek put it, did “large numbers of evangelicals . . . step[] 
out of cultural isolation and [begin to assume] the burdens of political 
responsibility once exercised largely by mainline Protestants in consort with 
Jewish and Catholic leaders.”15 
The legacy of this mutual alienation can be seen both in the relative 
absence of Christian legal scholarship and in the few exceptions to the rule.  
Much as with African Americans and race discrimination, theologically 
conservative Christians who wished to write faith-informed scholarship 
invariably found themselves writing about a single issue: the church-state 
issues governed by the religion clauses of the First Amendment.  Aside from a 
handful of other areas⎯most notably, Catholic scholarship informed by the 
long tradition of natural law theory⎯the church-state literature is almost the 
only place one can find extensive Christian legal scholarship.  This literature 
wrestles with an important but quite narrow question: What kinds of religious 
expression are permissible in the public square? 
What would a more robust Christian legal scholarship consider?  First, 
scholars might draw on Christian scripture or tradition to address the 
overarching, normative question of what the secular legal system should and 
should not attempt to regulate.  The working assumption of theologically 
conservative Christian activism on issues such as abortion, gambling, or 
criminal punishment seems to be that the law should promote morality by 
prohibiting immoral or sinful behavior.  But the law obviously cannot punish 
every sin; if it could, we would be putting people in jail for their angry or 
lustful thoughts.  One might expect to find a rich legal literature discussing and 
debating more nuanced Christian conceptions of the proper role of the secular 
law.  But one does not.16 
Not all legal scholarship is normative, of course.  One of the most 
influential recent developments in the legal, economic, and political science 
literature is the emergence of institutional economics and public choice.17  This 
literature, much of it wholly descriptive, has shed enormous light on the 
 
 14 MARK A. NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND 165 (1994). 
 15 Woodward, supra note 7, at 70. 
 16 Again, almost the only exceptions come not from Protestant evangelicals but from the natural law 
tradition in Catholicism.  Recent natural law theory is briefly surveyed in Part II.A, infra. 
 17 For an overview of this literature, see generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of 
Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1997). 
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mechanisms of interest group influence and on the nature of institutional and 
political decisionmaking.  It offers obvious promise as a way to examine the 
influence of theologically conservative Christians on legislative and judicial 
decisionmaking in the United States.  One might expect to find a rich legal 
literature using public choice and related scholarship to explore whether this 
influence operates through opinion leaders such as James Dobson or Chuck 
Colson, through church networks, or through other, nonchurch organizations; 
whether it is ideologically or economically driven; and whether the influence 
(or its absence) manifests itself differently on different issues.  Once again, one 
does not. 
That is the bad news, at least for those of us who care deeply about the 
relationship between theologically conservative Christianity and American 
law.  The good news is that these gaps in the literature do not seem likely to 
endure.  The current political environment has created a demand for insights 
into how theologically conservative Christians view the secular law and into 
the mechanisms of their influence.  My expectation, and my hope, is that 
scholars will soon start to fill this vacuum.  As we shall see, there are hints that 
this shift may already be underway. 
I am honored that this Article appears in the volume dedicated to the late 
Harold Berman.  As will be evident from the references to Berman’s 
scholarship, his work was a luminous exception to the dearth of Christian legal 
scholarship for much of the twentieth century, and it will continue to inspire in 
the century that is now unfolding. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the dearth of Christian 
legal scholarship and develops a historical explanation for this absence.  Part II 
surveys the four limited areas where one does find important Christian legal 
scholarship: the church-state literature, natural law and international human 
rights, Christian lawyering, and Christian legal history.  I conclude the Part by 
developing a simple definition of Christian legal scholarship, arguing that it (1) 
must provide either a normative theory derived from Christian scripture or 
tradition or a descriptive theory that explains some aspect of the influence of 
Christianity on law, or of law on Christianity; and (2) must seriously engage 
the best secular scholarship treating the same issues.   
With Part III, the Article shifts to a more constructive mode, from telling to 
showing, as I attempt to illustrate what a normative, and then a descriptive, 
Christian legal scholarship might look like.  Part IV develops the normative 
argument that Christian scripture calls for a more diffident use of secular law 
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than the “law as morality” perspective assumes.  I use Irish rock star and 
activist Bono and the debt relief campaign to explore the mechanisms of 
Christian influence in Part IV and then offer a brief conclusion. 
I. WHY SO LITTLE CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP? 
Until very recently, legal scholars have stayed almost entirely on the 
sidelines as the political and legal influence of theologically conservative 
Christians has increased.  Outside of a small handful of areas, each discussed 
in the next Part, there has been very little reflection in the scholarly legal 
literature on the relationship between Christianity and the secular law.  The 
most prominent exceptions are two recent books.  Both were published this 
decade; both underscore as much as dispel the strange absence of a rich body 
of Christian legal scholarship throughout the entire twentieth century. 
In 2001, Michael McConnell, Robert Cochran, and Angela Carmella 
published Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought, a collection of essays by 
twenty-eight legal scholars.18  The essays range from historical studies of 
classical liberal theory and marriage law, to Calvinist or Anabaptist or Catholic 
perspectives on particular legal issues, to a great deal of shop-talk: Christian 
assessments of legal academia and the various movements that have dominated 
secular legal scholarship in recent years.  A few of the essays are excellent, and 
Christian Perspectives is a pathbreaking experiment in possible Christian 
approaches.  But the essays do not develop any particular thesis or set of theses 
about the relationship between Christianity and law.19 
In 2005, a second book, The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, 
Politics, and Human Nature, appeared.20  The essays in this second book take a 
more unified tack.  For the principal volume, the editors selected twenty 
figures from the three major Christian traditions—seven Catholic, eight 
Protestant, and five Orthodox, and commissioned essays exploring the legacy 
of each.  (The second volume lets the twenty speak for themselves, providing a 
medley of excerpts culled from their writings).  The twenty succinct 
 
 18 CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). 
 19 For a summary of the individual essays and a superb review, see William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal 
Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (2003). 
 20 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY: ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE (John Witte, Jr. 
& Frank S. Alexander eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TEACHINGS].  The discussion in this paragraph is drawn in 
part from a short review of the book.  See David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s Law Got to Do with It?, BOOKS & 
CULTURE, July–Aug. 2006, at 32. 
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intellectual biographies tell one story more than any other: the great twentieth-
century struggle to define an appropriate stance of Christian churches toward 
the state.  In a century that saw European churches responding to 
totalitarianism in sometimes ambiguous ways, it is not surprising to find 
leading Christian figures worrying through theories of the state.  What is far 
more surprising, particularly for a project whose principal focus is law21 and 
whose two editors are law professors, is that none of the twenty figures 
featured in The Teachings of Modern Christianity is a legal scholar, and the 
essays only rarely grapple with particular legal issues and legal systems.  Does 
Christianity offer insights into the proper scope of the criminal law or into the 
rise of administrative lawmaking in the twentieth century?  What might a 
Christian perspective on gay rights and gay marriage or gambling regulation 
look like?  We are not told.  Although the twenty subjects are singled out for 
their contributions on law, they have remarkably little to say about the kinds of 
issues the term “law” brings to mind for most of us.  The chief exceptions, 
moreover, come from those known more for their social and political 
contributions than for scholarly ones: Susan B. Anthony’s campaign for 
women’s suffrage in the late nineteenth century, Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
the Civil Rights movement. 
The observations that the essays of Christian Perspectives lack 
coordinating themes and that law figures hardly at all in The Teachings of 
Modern Christianity should not be taken as criticisms of either book.  Both are 
important scholarly contributions, as their frequent appearance in the footnotes 
of this Article will attest, and the essays in the latter are consistently superb.  
Instead, the two books are profoundly representative of the recent history of 
Christian legal scholarship in America: for most of the twentieth century, there 
was almost no Christian legal scholarship (the dog that does not bark in The 
Teachings of Modern Christianity); even now, it is not clear whether there is 
any “there there” (the lesson of Christian Perspectives). 
A. The Historical Hostility to Religious Perspectives 
What gives?  Why, as the twentieth century progressed and the legal 
system came to play an increasingly prominent role in American life, do we 
not see a similar growth in Christian legal reflection on law and legal issues?  
 
 21 The two volumes of The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature are 
the product of the “law” team, one of ten groups of specialists assembled by The Pew Charitable Trusts and 
the University of Notre Dame “to stimulate and support new scholarship on the place of Christianity in various 
fields of academic specialty.”  THE TEACHINGS, supra note 20, at xix. 
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As noted in the Introduction, the most obvious explanations—that Christian 
legal theory is a subsidiary of conservative legal thought, that American 
evangelicals are anti-intellectual—are unsatisfying.  The editors of The 
Teachings of Modern Christianity offer a more plausible, historically informed 
explanation drawn from the evolution of Anglo-American legal education.22  
The explanation is incomplete, as we shall see, but it begins to make sense of 
the puzzling absence of Christian legal scholarship. 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the editors write, a “new [legal] 
movement⎯known variously as legal positivism, legal formalism, and 
analytical jurisprudence⎯sought to reduce the subject matter of law to its most 
essential core.”  Generally identified with John Austin in England and 
Christopher Columbus Langdell in the U.S., the legal positivists insisted that 
law “is simply the concrete rules and procedures posited by the sovereign and 
enforced by the courts.  Many other institutions and practices might be 
normative and important for social coherence and political concordance.  But 
they are not law.”23  “This positivist theory of law,” they continue, “which 
swept over American universities from the 1890s onward, rendered legal study 
increasingly narrow and insular . . . .  Legal study was simply the analysis of 
the rules that were posited, and their application in particular cases.  Why these 
rules were posited, whether their positing was for good or ill, how these rules 
affected society, politics, or morality were not relevant questions for legal 
study.”24  In this account, then, the absence of Christian reflection on legal 
issues can be traced to the lingering effects of legal positivism and the 
positivists’ campaign to establish law as a science, a self-contained system 
disconnected from the messy world of politics, religion, or culture. 
It is not simply that the narrow legal positivism associated in the U.S. with 
Langdell crowded out the consideration of other perspectives on law, however, 
and that Christian reflection was a casualty of the positivists’ austere, 
formalistic vision.  Throughout the twentieth century, this narrow legal 
positivism jostled for supremacy with alternative perspectives that were 
explicitly interdisciplinary and often nonpositivist in orientation.  In the 1930s, 
 
 22 Although this Article focuses on the absence of Christian legal reflection in American law schools, the 
pattern in Great Britain is similar.  See, e.g., GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE OUTRAGEOUS IDEA OF CHRISTIAN 
SCHOLARSHIP 21 (1997) [hereinafter OUTRAGEOUS IDEA] (citing and discussing the account given in 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL INQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND 
TRADITION (1990)). 
 23 THE TEACHINGS, supra note 20, at xxii−xxiii. 
 24 Id. at xxiii. 
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the Legal Realists insisted that legal scholars needed to consider sociology, 
economics, psychology, and even anthropology if they wished to fully 
understand the law.25  In the 1970s, Critical Legal Studies, drawing on 
continental philosophy and literary criticism, among other resources, insisted 
that the law is inherently political, an insight that paved the way for feminist, 
race-based, and other perspectives.26  Throughout the century, there were even 
scholars, such as Lon Fuller and later Ronald Dworkin, who insisted that the 
law is inherently moral.27 
But religion was different.  In the 1970s, one of the few legal scholars who 
contended that religion has contemporary as well as historical relevance for 
law was Harold Berman, then a professor at Harvard Law School.  When his 
book The Interaction of Law and Religion28 appeared in 1974, Berman sent 
copies to each of his colleagues. None of them acknowledged the gift.  “It was 
simply an embarrassment to them,” he recalled with a hint of bitterness, “for a 
colleague to link law with religion, and especially with Christianity.”29  Even 
as non-positivist approaches proliferated in the legal literature, most legal 
academics assumed that religion had little to offer for the study of law and 
legal issues. 
As a historical matter, this disinterest in religion is deeply ironic: many of 
the university leaders who ushered in the perspective were themselves 
genuinely religious, theologically liberal Protestant Christians.  “Most of the 
first generation of university builders” who transformed American higher 
 
 25 Although Legal Realism was often viewed as positivist, especially by critics such as Lon Fuller, this 
was a matter of ongoing debate.  Llewellyn, for instance, was careful to insist that the separation of “is” from 
“ought” in Legal Realist inquiry was only temporary.  Moreover, the sociological jurisprudence that preceded 
Realism and the movements that challenged or succeeded it were often non-positivist.  See generally Roscoe 
Pound, Jurisprudence, in THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 444, 458 (Harry Elmer 
Barnes ed., 1925) (suggesting that the sociological jurisprudents were “chiefly positivists or neo-realists”); G. 
Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early 
Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972) (comparing the Realists’ skepticism of moral values to 
the moralism in Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence). 
 26 The classic anthology on this theme is THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys 
ed., 1990). 
 27 As we shall see, Fuller even characterized his approach as having a “natural law” orientation and 
served on the advisory board of the Natural Law Forum.  But his was an explicitly secular natural law.  See, 
e.g., Charles L. Palms, The Natural Law Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller, 11 CATH. LAW. 94, 112 (1965); Lon L. 
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 660 (1958). 
 28 HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974).  What made Berman’s book 
distinctive was not so much the historical claim that law and religion have influenced one another, as his 
claim, noted in the text, that religion has contemporary relevance for law. 
 29 Harold J. Berman, Foreword to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 18, at xi, 
xii. 
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education in the last third of the nineteenth century, George Marsden has 
written, “were New Englanders who had grown up during the Civil War era 
and were inspired by ideals that paralleled those of the Yankee cause in the 
Civil War.”30  For the university builders, the central theme was freedom.  “In 
their view,” as Marsden puts it, “freedom was an outgrowth of the best in the 
Protestant tradition as opposed to Catholic authoritarianism.”31 
In defending his decision to permit students to choose their own courses in 
the 1880s, for instance, Harvard President Charles Eliot argued that “[t]he 
elective system . . . is in the first place, an outcome of the spirit of the 
Protestant Reformation.  In the next place, it is an outcome of the spirit of 
political liberty.”32  To honor both, he believed, the university should promote 
unfettered inquiry and the most up-to-date scientific thought.  Although 
traditional religious inquiry was excluded, he and other university leaders did 
not believe that the exclusion undermined Christianity.  “Rather,” as Marsden 
puts it, “they believed that scientific investigation would advance civilization 
and hence promote the kingdom of God.”33 
Starting in 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell—who, though not 
identifiably religious himself, had been handpicked by Eliot to run Harvard’s 
law school⎯had applied similar principles to legal education, devising a 
systematic, case-oriented approach to law that divided legal doctrine into 
principles and categories.  Legal scholars systematically analyzed judicial 
cases to determine the key principles that animated a given area of the law.  
These principles could then be applied to any subsequent dispute that arose.  
“If law be not a science,” he wrote in defense of his method, 
a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it.  If 
law be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be 
learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices it.  If it be 
a science, it will scarcely be disputed that it is one of the greatest and 
most difficult of sciences, and that it needs all the light that the most 
enlightened seat of learning can throw upon it.34 
 
 30 MARSDEN, supra note 22, at 14. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Quoted in GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT 
ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 188 (1994) [hereinafter SOUL OF THE UNIVERSITY]. 
 33 MARSDEN, supra note 22, at 15. 
 34 Quoted in Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Oxthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 38 (1983).  Langdellian legal 
science swept the nation’s leading law schools, but not so early as is often supposed.  “[T]he ultimate triumph 
of that system,” Konefsky and Schlegel have written, “was not apparent until at least 1910 when the West 
Publishing Company thought that the market was large enough to support an entire series of case books.”  
SKEEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/12/2008  2:24:13 PM 
2008] CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1485 
By the 1910s and 1920s, Langdellian legal science was itself derided as too 
metaphysical and quasi-religious—as insufficiently scientific—by a new 
generation of legal scholars.  Roscoe Pound dismissed the Langdellian 
approach as “mechanical jurisprudence;”35 to the Legal Realists, it was 
“transcendental” nonsense.36  A truly scientific approach, both argued, must 
look beyond the cases and rules.  It must bring the insights of the sociology 
and other human sciences to bear.  Religion was almost entirely ignored by 
both, especially the Realists, many of whom were fascinated with 
psychological insights but skeptical of traditional morality.37  Although the 
Realists began to place more emphasis on morality later in the 1930s, when the 
emergence of totalitarian regimes in Europe called their apparent moral 
indifference into severe question, the new interest in moral values never 
extended to religion.  Nor did the interest in religious perspectives increase 
after the Realists were succeeded by other American legal movements.  
“[R]esidual prejudices against religious viewpoints as inherently unscientific,” 
as George Marsden has argued about the academic world more generally, 
“seem[ed] to persist as a dominant academic paradigm” throughout the 
twentieth century.38 
One revealing, though admittedly rough, measure of the absence of 
religious perspectives in legal scholarship is the articles published in the 
leading law reviews over the course of the twentieth century.  To assess the 
 
Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 833, 837 (1982). 
 35 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908). 
 36 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 
(1935).  For a similar argument about the secularization of American legal scholarship, both with Langdell and 
with his critics, see David Sikkink, From Christian Civilization to Individual Liberties: Framing Religion in 
the Legal Field, 1880–1949, in THE SECULAR REVOLUTION: POWER, INTERESTS, AND CONFLICT IN THE 
SECULARIZATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 310, 313 (Christian Smith ed., 2003).  See also id. at 328 (noting 
that Langdell was derided by Oliver Wendell Holmes as a “legal theologian”). 
 37 These tendencies seem to have been linked.  “The thrust of [social] science research,” Ted White has 
written, “was that human behavior was idiosyncratic and often irrational and that external sanctions on 
personal actions were actually products of an individual’s own psyche.  This insight was subversive of 
collective behavior standards based on external phenomena, such as religious or moral beliefs.”  White, supra 
note 25, at 1015. 
 38 MARSDEN, supra note 22, at 27.  For a still more recent sounding of this theme, see C. John 
Sommerville, The Exhaustion of Secularism, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 9, 2006, at B6 (noting that “the 
great bulk of the American population identifies itself as religious, while universities make a point of not 
recognizing any such point of view”).  For a critique of Marden’s claim, see BALMER, supra note 12, at 142 
(“Contrary to Marsden’s assertions, people of faith are welcome in [America’s universities], but they have to 
compete on an equal footing in the marketplace of ideas.”).  For a largely sympathetic account of the 
secularization of law academia in the twentieth century as of the late 1960s, see Calvin Woodard, The Limits of 
Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968). 
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relative visibility of Christian legal scholarship, I surveyed the articles in the 
elite law reviews from 1900 (or the year when the review began, whichever 
was later) to 2000.39  Although articles that might qualify as Christian legal 
scholarship occasionally appeared in leading reviews in the opening decade or 
so of the century,40 religious perspectives almost entirely disappear after this.41  
The one exception, not surprisingly, is articles debating the First Amendment 
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the late 1940s and thereafter. 42  Even 
these articles, moreover, generally are not written from an identifiably 
religious perspective and often do not draw on the insights of Christianity or 
other religions.43  Overall, the more quantitative assessment of this study 
confirms what our qualitative analysis would have predicted: the leading law 
reviews published very few articles that could be described as Christian legal 
scholarship during the course of the twentieth century. 
B. The Wages of Evangelical Anti-Intellectualism 
It would be a mistake to attribute the dearth of Christian legal scholarship 
solely to the academy’s disinterest in religious perspectives, however.  The 
disdain did not run in one direction only.  Secular academics may have closed 
the door, but for much of the twentieth century, theologically conservative 
 
 39 For the first half of the twentieth century, the elite law reviews were Harvard Law Review, Columbia 
Law Review, and Yale Law Journal, so I began with these reviews.  I initially looked at the titles of the articles.  
If the title suggested that an article might possibly draw on Christianity or Christian perspectives (if it included 
the word “moral” for instance, or alluded to the Bible or religion), I looked at the article itself.  In order to 
obtain a somewhat broader sense of the trends in leading law reviews, I also surveyed Michigan Law Review, 
University of Chicago Law Review (as well as Illinois Law Review, which was published by Northwestern and 
Chicago in the early twentieth century), University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Virginia Law Review, and 
California Law Review.  In future work, the study will be expanded to develop a comparison between the most 
elite and other law reviews. 
 40 See, e.g., Carl Zollman, Religious Liberty in the American Law, 17 MICH. L. REV. 355 (1919); 
Clarence A. Lightner, The Mosaic Law, 10 MICH. L. REV. 108 (1911); John Marshall Gest, The Influence of 
Biblical Texts Upon English Law, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1910); Charles Foster Kent, A Tentative Codification 
of the Old Testament Laws, 15 YALE L.J. 284 (1906).  The Kent and Lightner articles reflect the theologically 
liberal perspective of nineteenth century critical scholarship on the Bible. 
 41 An intriguing exception that proves the rule is William Waller, The Constitutionality of the Tennessee 
Anti-Evolution Act, 35 YALE L.J. 191 (1925), which explores the act that gave rise to the Scopes trial.  Before 
embarking on an analysis of Constitutional problems with the act, Waller attributes its enactment to three 
factors: “(1) an aggressive campaign by a militant minority of religious zealots of the ‘Fundamentalist’ faith; 
(2) lack of knowledge of modern scientific and religious thought in the rural districts which control Tennessee 
politically; (3) political cowardice and demagogy.”  Id. at 191. 
 42 For a prominent example outside the reviews I surveyed, see Symposium on Religion and the State, 14 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1−159 (1949). 
 43 Some of them do, however, qualify as Christian legal scholarship under the definition I propose in Part 
II.E, infra. 
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Christians were not asking anyone to let them in.  Especially was this so with 
Protestant evangelicals. 
The late nineteenth-century assumption that science and nondoctrinal 
Christianity went hand-in-glove was one of two very different Christian 
responses to modernity.  Rather than embracing Darwinism and the new 
“higher” criticism of the Bible, as did the education reformers and their 
theological counterparts in the Social Gospel movement,44 theologically 
conservative Christians confronted these developments head on.45  The subset 
of evangelicalism known as fundamentalism is often dated to 1910, when a 
group of American and British Christians began publishing The Fundamentals, 
a defense of theological orthodoxy and assault on modernity that filled twelve 
paperback volumes by 1915.46  The fundamentalists of this era were not ones 
to duck a cultural fight.  Indeed, a leading historian defines a fundamentalist as 
“an evangelical who is militant in opposition to liberal theology in the 
churches or to changes in cultural values or mores, such as those associated 
with ‘secular humanism.’”47 
One of the last notable legislative victories in which evangelicals and 
fundamentalists participated during this era was Prohibition, enacted in 1919.  
By the mid 1920s, with the death of William Jennings Bryan and the failure of 
Prohibition, evangelicals had begun to abandon the cultural battlegrounds and 
 
 44 The Social Gospel was an optimistic movement whose leading figures campaigned for social reform, 
downplayed the supernatural aspects of Christian scripture, and expected continuing progress in human affairs.  
The movement, which was in some respects the forerunner of the Progressive movement, and key proponents 
such as Walter Rauschenbusch and Shailer Mathews are chronicled in GARY DORRIEN, SOUL IN SOCIETY: THE 
MAKING AND RENEWAL OF SOCIAL CHRISTIANITY (1995).  For an excellent recent biography of 
Rauschenbusch, see CHRISTOPHER H. EVANS, THE KINGDOM IS ALWAYS BUT COMING: A LIFE OF WALTER 
ROUSCHENBUSH (2004). 
 45 The clash between Christian liberalism and the theologically orthodox was reflected in Daniel Coit 
Gilman’s university presidencies at Berkeley and then Johns Hopkins.  During Berkeley’s founding years, 
Gilman fended off the barbs of theologically conservative critics who complained about the absence of religion 
at university ceremonies in 1873.  MARSDEN, supra note 22, at 27.  When he headed east to serve as the 
inaugural president of Johns Hopkins, Gilman was excoriated by orthodox Christians for inviting the 
prominent Darwinian Thomas Huxley to give a public lecture shortly after the university opened.  See SOUL OF 
THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 32, at 152 (noting that the editors of the Christian Advocate “suggested the 
Hopkins board should perhaps ‘retrace their steps, repent of their sins, make their peace with God and give 
their university a Christian management’”) 
 46 THE FUNDAMENTALS: A TESTIMONY TO THE TRUTH, 12 VOLS. (1910–15).  For discussion, see, for 
example, GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 41 (1991). 
 47 MARSDEN, supra note 46, at 1.  In addition to their reaction against modernity, fundamentalists have 
tended to adopt an extreme literalist stance toward Biblical interpretation.  For discussion, see, for example, 
NOLL, supra note 14, at 123−26.  Fundamentalists also were quicker to abandon the mainline denominations in 
the early twentieth century than other evangelicals. 
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to turn resolutely inward.  In the churches, many evangelicals left the major 
denominations rather than fighting for doctrinal orthodoxy; in politics, their 
campaigns for reform “gave way to cultural pessimism and a fear of 
governmental encroachment.”48 
In the universities, the disappearing act had begun even earlier.  Populist in 
orientation, evangelicals had long defined themselves against the intellectual 
elite, generally thumbing their nose at secular learning.  The relationship 
between William Jennings Bryan and Roscoe Pound is revealing in this regard.  
The two seem to have met at least once, as opposing counsel in a Nebraska 
courtroom, but they had an instinctive distaste for each other and their 
respective constituencies.  Pound “found the raw protest of lower class reform 
distasteful,” according to his biographer, and “Bryan’s people” had little time 
for the intellectual establishment.49  By the mid 1920s, as the broader 
retrenchment began, evangelicals were nowhere to be found in American 
academia.  No doubt there were at least a few evangelical law professors, but 
their presence is not reflected in any discernible way in the legal literature. 
The first hints of an end to the evangelicals’ hibernation from American 
public life came in the 1940s.  Harold Ockenga, the longtime pastor at Park 
Street Church in Boston, as well as the president at various times of Fuller 
Theological Seminary in California and Gordon-Conwell Theological 
Seminary outside of Boston, promoted a “new evangelicalism that would value 
scholarship and take an active interest in society while maintaining traditional 
Protestant orthodoxy.”50  Carl Henry, a reporter, seminary professor, and later 
the first editor of the magazine Christianity Today, sounded the same themes 
as Ockenga in a 1947 manifesto entitled The Uneasy Conscience of Modern 
Fundamentalism: 
The troubled conscience of the modern liberal, growing out of his 
superficial optimism, is a deep thing in modern times.  But so is the 
uneasy conscience of the modern Fundamentalist, that no voice is 
speaking today as [the Apostle] Paul would, either at the United 
Nations sessions, or at labor-management disputes, or in strategic 
university classrooms . . . .51 
 
 48 NOLL, supra note 14, at 165. 
 49 DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 74 (1974).  The (non)relationship between 
Bryan and Pound is discussed in more detail in David A. Skeel, Jr., The Paths of Christian Legal Scholarship 
(Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 50 NOLL, supra note 14, at 213. 
 51 CARL F.H. HENRY, THE UNEASY CONSCIENCE OF MODERN FUNDAMENTALISM 34 (1947).  In keeping 
with the usage of the time, Henry treated the terms evangelical and fundamentalist as completely 
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Henry called for an end to fundamentalism’s “embarrassing divorce from a 
world social program.”52  Theologically conservative Christians “must offer a 
formula for a new world mind with spiritual ends, involving evangelical 
affirmations in political, economic, sociological, and educational realms, local 
and international.”53  In the academic setting, evangelicals needed to “contend 
for a fair hearing for the Christian mind,” and to “develop a competent 
literature in every field of study, on every level from the grade school through 
the university.”54 
Ockenga, Henry, and a handful of others, bolstered by the encouragement 
and support of Billy Graham, founded a series of important evangelical 
institutions, including the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942, Fuller 
Theological Seminary in 1947, and Christianity Today in 1957.55  These 
institutions, each of which remains prominent today, laid the foundation for an 
evangelical voice in American public life.  So too did a series of Supreme 
Court decisions—most prominently, the school prayer decisions of the 
1960s—which evangelicals perceived as threatening.  But the full flowering of 
this re-engagement did not come until later, in the 1970s. 
One of the lightning rods for the true re-emergence of evangelicals was the 
Supreme Court’s enshrinement of abortion rights in its 1973 Roe v. Wade56 
decision, although Roe did not become an evangelical bête noir until late in the 
decade.57  Another was the debate over states’ ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment, which activists like Phyllis Schafly successfully portrayed as a 
threat to the traditional family structure.58  Other key events included singer 
Anita Bryant’s campaign to overturn a Miami-Dade County law that protected 
gay rights and an IRS challenge59 to the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones 
 
interchangeable.  His call for Christian re-engagement in social issues marks him as what we would now call 
an evangelical. 
 52 Id. at 76. 
 53 Id. at 68. 
 54 Id. at 70. 
 55 See, e.g., MARSDEN, supra note 46, at 69–73. 
 56 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 57 George Marsden, The Sword of the Lord: How “Otherworldly” Fundamentalism Became a Political 
Power, BOOKS & CULTURE, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 10, 11. 
 58 See, e.g., id.  Marsden notes that Schafly was one of the first Catholics “to effectively reach across the 
long-standing divide” between Catholics and evangelical Protestants.  Id. 
 59 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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University and other Southern Christian schools on racial discrimination 
grounds.60 
The most visible representatives of the new evangelical activism were the 
Moral Majority, which was formed by Jerry Falwell in 1979, and later, Pat 
Robertson’s Christian Coalition.  The intellectual heft, however, came from a 
small group of less-widely known evangelicals who were the direct intellectual 
heirs of Henry and Ockenga.  Of these, the most important was Francis A. 
Schaeffer. 
A Presbyterian minister who started his career as a pastor in St. Louis, 
Schaeffer established a Christian retreat center known as L’Abri at a small 
mountain lodge in Switzerland.  Western culture, he argued, had abandoned its 
Christian origins and drifted into a pervasive humanism that devalues life and 
eschews moral absolutes.  It was Schaeffer who singled out Roe v. Wade as a 
particularly dire illustration of the culture gone amok.  Schaeffer helped turn 
the case into a focal point of evangelical activism, most famously with a film 
series (which also featured future Surgeon General C. Everett Koop) called 
Whatever Happened to the Human Race?, which made the rounds of 
evangelical churches throughout the U.S. and Britain. 
Although Schaeffer railed most angrily at the prevailing culture, he also 
directed his ire inward, at his fellow evangelicals—particularly evangelical 
lawyers.  “Now I have a question,” he wrote in A Christian Manifesto.  “In the 
shifts that have come in law [from Christian conceptions of truth to relativistic 
pluralism], where were the Christian lawyers . . . ?”61  “[W]e must say,” he 
concluded, “that the Christians in the legal profession did not ring the bell, and 
we are indeed very, very far down the road toward a totally humanistic 
culture.”62  While Schaeffer recognized that “there are going to be people who 
say, ‘don’t use the legal and political means, just show the Christian 
alternatives,’” he insisted that sticking to spiritual rather than worldly 
 
 60 See Marsden supra note 57.  The fight over the schools is viewed by many as having been the most 
important stimulus for evangelical activism.  See, e.g., NO LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 26 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993) (quoting conservative activist Paul Weyrich that 
“[w]hat caused the movement to surface was the federal government’s moves against Christian schools,” 
rather than school prayer or abortion); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the 
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 340 (2001) (attributing evangelical activism to proposed IRS 
regulations that “would have presumed that schools begun during a period of desegregation were 
segregationist”). 
 61 FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO 47 (1981). 
 62 Id. at 49. 
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responses “is absolutely utopian in a fallen world, and specifically in a world 
such as ours at the present moment.”63 
Other evangelicals sounded similar themes.  In the late 1970s and 1980s, 
after his dramatic jailhouse conversion, Watergate felon Chuck Colson 
founded the evangelistic prison ministry Prison Fellowship and chronicled his 
spiritual journey in a series of widely read books.64  Colson’s example, as well 
as his call for Christian engagement, sent the message that evangelicals could 
make a difference in law, business, or politics.  In 1984, the Lutheran-turned-
Catholic Richard John Neuhaus published The Naked Public Square, a call to 
arms decrying the perceived exclusion of religious voices from the political 
debate.65  By the 1980s, the era of evangelical retrenchment was a fading 
memory. 
A similar message has percolated into the academic setting, but the 
diffusion has been much slower.  In the 1980s and 1990s, and even today, 
evangelicals cannot be said to have fully achieved Carl Henry’s vision for “a 
competent [Christian] literature in every field of study, on every level from the 
grade school through the university.”66 
C. Catholic Legal Scholarship: Hidden in Plain Sight 
The trajectory of Catholic legal scholarship over the course of the twentieth 
century was quite different from that of evangelicals, yet with the same overall 
result.  Unlike with evangelicals, Catholic scholarship never disappeared.  
Drawing on the neo-Thomist natural law tradition inaugurated by Pope Leo 
XIII’s writings at the end of the nineteenth century, Catholic scholars produced 
serious, faith-inflected scholarship throughout the twentieth century.  The most 
influential scholarship in this vein came outside the law school context, as 
exemplified by writings of theologian and philosopher Jacques Maritain and 
theologian-political scientist John Courtney Murray.  But an extensive body of 
Catholic legal scholarship also emerged, particularly in the second half of the 
 
 63 Id. at 133.  Schaeffer’s manifesto directly inspired John Whitehead and Schaeffer’s son Frank 
Schaeffer to start the Rutherford Institute, a Christian legal defense fund, and it can be seen as the indirect 
inspiration for other defense funds such as the American Center for Law & Justice (ACLJ), whose chief 
counsel is Jay Sekulow.  Whitehead’s own manifesto is JOHN WHITEHEAD, THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1982).  The leading evangelical defense funds are described and analyzed in STEVEN P. BROWN, 
TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS 27–45 (2002). 
 64 See, e.g., CHARLES W. COLSON, LOVING GOD (1983); CHARLES W. COLSON, BORN AGAIN (1976). 
 65 RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984). 
 66 HENRY, supra note 51, at 70. 
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century after Notre Dame started its Natural Law Institute in 1947 and with the 
advent in 1955 of The Catholic Lawyer.67 
Yet this writing had little effect on American legal scholarship, and it was 
conspicuously absent from the elite law reviews.68  In part, the absence of 
Catholic legal scholarship can be traced to the same tendencies described 
earlier.  In the quest to establish law as a scientific discipline, reformers 
consciously excluded religion, and the disinterest in religious perspectives 
endured for decades thereafter.  Indeed, natural law scholarship was singled 
out for particular disapproval because it was viewed, rightly or wrongly, as 
responsible for the perceived doctrinal rigidities of the nineteenth century.69 
With Catholic legal scholarship, an additional factor came into play as well.  
The Catholic church faced sustained criticism from American intellectual elites 
for much of the century.  Catholics, according to the standard indictment, 
isolated themselves from other Americans and answered to an authoritarian 
church hierarchy that was inimical to democracy.70  The criticism intensified 
shortly before and during World War II, when the church’s support for or 
acquiescence in fascist regimes in Spain and elsewhere seemed to confirm that 
the church had authoritarian, antidemocratic tendencies.71  This debate had 
occasional reverberations in the legal literature.  Everson v. Board of 
Education,72 for instance, the 1947 Supreme Court decision holding that 
busing Catholic children to parochial schools did not violate the First 
Amendment, spawned a large literature.  But it seems unlikely that a 
distinctively Catholic perspective on these issues would have been welcome in 
 
 67 See, e.g., Edward F. Barrett, The Notre Dame Experiment, 2 CATH. LAW. 294, 298–99 (1956) 
(describing the founding of the Natural Law Institute). 
 68 One of the few articles in my study of leading law reviews that reflected a distinctively Catholic 
perspective appeared in the Virginia Law Review.  See generally Brendan F. Brown, The Canon Law of 
Marriage, 26 VA. L. REV. 70 (1939). 
 69 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41–42 (1918); Roscoe 
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 465 (1909) (criticizing the constitutional law of his time as “full 
of natural law notions”).  The extent to which natural law did, in fact, shape American law in the nineteenth 
century has been questioned.  See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 1231, 1239–40 (1995). 
 70 A study of Philadelphia’s Polish Catholics overseen by the prominent philosopher John Dewey in the 
1910s concluded, for instance, that Polish Catholicism “is a world which is simply not our world, a world in 
which independent criticism and disinterested science is and must remain unknown.”  Quoted in JOHN T. 
MCGREEVEY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 169 (2003).  The root cause was the 
church itself, which posed a “many-sided and in some ways impossible barrier to the real democratization of 
the communities it controls.”  Id. 
 71 Id. at 171–73. 
 72 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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the leading law reviews.  Even after tensions between American liberal 
intellectuals and Catholics began to thaw starting in the late 1950s, Catholic 
legal scholarship was largely confined to Catholic law journals. 
A remarkable illustration of both the existence of Catholic legal scholarship 
and its exclusion from the elite law reviews came during a critical backlash 
against Oliver Wendell Holmes during the turbulent years of the 1940s.  The 
tendencies for which Holmes had been lionized by the Legal Realists and 
others—his skepticism of morality, his insistence that the life of the law is 
experience, not logic—were sharply criticized by several Jesuit scholars.73  
Holmes’ claim that the law has no moral content, they argued, would leave no 
moral resources for combating the horrific totalitarian regimes that were 
sprouting in Europe.  Or in the more incendiary language of the most 
prominent of the articles: “This much may be said for Realism.  If man is only 
an animal, Realism is correct, Holmes was correct, Hitler is correct.”74 
In 1951, Harvard law professor and future Holmes biographer Mark 
DeWolfe Howe rallied to Holmes’s defense in the pages of the Harvard Law 
Review, arguing that Holmes’s most notorious statements, which seemed to 
reflect a thorough-going positivism, had been misconstrued by his critics.75  
For present purposes, two aspects of the critique of Holmes’s legacy and of 
Howe’s elegant defense are especially striking.  First, as already noted, none of 
the distinctively Catholic contributions appeared in a then-elite law review.  
 
 73 John C. Ford, S.J., The Fundamentals of Holmes’ Juristic Philosophy, in PHASES OF AMERICAN 
CULTURE 51–83 (1942); Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective 
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942); see also Walter B. 
Kennedy, Realism, What Next?, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 203 (1938). 
For a discussion of the neo-Thomist revival in Catholic law schools and universities that inspired the 
challenges to Holmes and Legal Realism, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159–78 (1973) (citing the work of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association, which added a roundtable on philosophy and law to its annual meetings as 
of 1933 and the publication in 1938 of the third edition of Father Francis P. Le Buffe’s Jurisprudence as 
important early developments).  The Catholic criticism of Holmes came at a time when the church was 
defending itself against the charges noted earlier, and Catholic scholars sought to demonstrate the 
compatibility of Catholicism and American democracy.  See, e.g., MCGREEVY, supra note 70, at 192 (noting 
that Catholics defended their church “as more American than mid-twentieth century liberals, as the rightful 
descendants of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison”). 
 74 Lucey, supra note 73, at 531.  For similar criticism of Holmes in less-scholarly venues, see, for 
example, Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569, 571 (1945) (“The fact that Holmes 
was a polished gentleman who did not go about like a storm-trooper knocking people down and proclaiming 
the supremacy of the blond beast should not blind us to his philosophy that might makes right, that law is the 
command of the dominant social group.”).  See also Ben W. Palmer, Defense Against Leviathan, 32 A.B.A. J. 
328 (1946). 
 75 Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529, 537–40 (1951). 
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Although the leading law reviews devoted countless pages to writings by (and 
about) Holmes and the Legal Realists, and by critics such as Lon Fuller, none 
of the writings reflected a Catholic perspective.  The Catholic response was 
confined to Catholic legal journals and the law reviews of Catholic law 
schools.76 
Second, and related, although the principal response to Holmes’s 
skepticism of traditional morality was characterized as natural law, both its 
proponents and critics like Howe emphasized that the natural law in question 
was divorced from the divine.77  The living end of the theological and 
philosophical tradition of natural law, at least as perceived by American legal 
scholars, was secular in nature.  After noting that Fuller and other scholars “are 
encouraging the revival of natural law,” for instance, Howe quickly added that 
these scholars “do not ask us to receive it with all its implications of divine 
authority.”78  Howe himself was skeptical even of this nontheological natural 
law.  “If we should accept it,” he concluded, “are we not likely soon to find 
ourselves not only allied with those who repudiate the achievements of 
skepticism but eager to rediscover the comforts of the absolute?  If that 
eagerness becomes predominant in our philosophy, we shall be obliged once 
more to free ourselves from the old shackles.”79 
Although Catholic legal scholarship in the natural law tradition existed, it, 
like other Christian legal scholarship, was thus almost entirely absent from the 
mainstream American legal literature for much of the twentieth century. 
II. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP TODAY: A BRIEF SURVEY 
The idea of Christian legal scholarship is no longer unthinkable.  The deep 
ties between evangelicals and the Bush Administration, as well as the 
 
 76 It may be that Catholic legal scholars themselves are part of the explanation here.  See generally John 
A. O’Brien, in CATHOLICS AND SCHOLARSHIP (1960) (complaining that Catholic universities had not produced 
a single nationally important scholar).  But this clearly is not the entire explanation. 
 77 Roscoe Pound was a partial exception to this tendency.  After surveying natural law theory in France 
as part of an overview of recent jurisprudential developments, Pound had earlier suggested that the religious 
version of natural law theory usually had “very little result” as an explanation of “juridical progress and . . . 
legal institutions,” but that “such cases as the Stoic influence upon the classical period of Roman law and 
Puritan influence on the common law warn us that this interpretation is not to be despised.”  Pound, supra note 
4, pt. 2, at 164 n.93; see also Linus J. McManaman, The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 13 CATH. LAW. 
98, 122 (1967) (“Though not a strong advocate of natural law himself, [Pound] has been largely responsible 
for introducing European ideas of legal philosophy into America.”). 
 78 Howe, supra note 73, at 545; see also Palms, supra note 28, at 112. 
 79 Howe, supra note 73, at 546. 
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suggestion that “values” issues may have tipped the last presidential election, 
have stirred up interest on both sides of the cultural divide: theologically 
conservative Christians are anxious to contribute faith-informed scholarship to 
the scholarly conversation, and secular scholars are anxious to understand what 
makes American evangelicals tick.  But the most important recent Christian 
legal scholarship is still clustered in a handful of niches.  The discussion that 
follows briefly surveys the four contexts in which distinctively Christian 
insights are best developed.80 
A. Natural Law (and International Human Rights) 
Throughout the twentieth century, Neo-Thomist Catholic theologians and 
scholars ranging from Jacques Maritain to John Courtney Murray explored the 
insights of natural law theory outside of the law school setting, and Catholic 
legal scholars considered its implications in the law reviews of Catholic law 
schools and publications such as Catholic Lawyer and Natural Law Forum.81  
But theologically informed natural law scholarship was largely absent from 
mainstream American legal scholarship, as we have just seen.  In the past 
several decades, however, there has been a dramatic revival of faith-inflected 
natural law scholarship. 
The revitalization of natural law theory in the legal and jurisprudential 
literature can be traced to the Australian legal philosopher John Finnis.  In his 
1980 book Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis developed both a sustained 
critique of positivist legal philosophy and a distinctively new conception of 
natural law.82  At the heart of Finnis’s theory are seven basic goods: life, 
knowledge, play, aesthetics, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion.  
 
 80 This Part will not attempt to provide a complete bibliography of Christian legal scholarship.  For 
additional citations, see, for example, MICHAEL P. SCHUTT, LAW AND THE BIBLICAL TRADITION: SELECT 
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHRISTIAN LAW STUDENTS (3d ed. 2001), available at http://www.clsnet.org/lsmPages/ 
ICLS/bibliography.pdf.  It also bears emphasis that this Article is concerned with the American legal literature 
and thus does not consider developments in Europe and elsewhere. 
 81 Perhaps the best known legal scholar writing in these venues was John Noonan, who wrote for and 
served on the board of the Natural Law Forum (later renamed American Journal of Jurisprudence), and has 
continued to write extensively on natural law issues during his distinguished career as a Ninth Circuit Judge.  
The modern wellspring of the developments described in this section and of the closely related natural law 
concepts of subsidiarity and Catholic Social Thought was Pope Leo XIII—in particular, his 1891 encyclical 
Rerum novarum.  For a useful overview, see Russell Hittinger, Pope Leo XIII, in THE TEACHINGS, supra note 
20, at 39–74.  Recent legal scholarship drawing on the tradition of Catholic Social Thought is described in Part 
III.D, infra. 
 82 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).  Finnis draws extensively and explicitly 
on the work of Germain Grisez. 
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According to Finnis, the seven goods are incommensurable.  Each is essential 
and cannot be weighed against the others.  A person acts morally, Finnis 
argues, if she acts in a manner that does not directly harm any one of the seven 
goods.  Based on this framework, Finnis has defended the traditional Catholic 
views on birth control, abortion, and gay rights, arguing that only sexual 
activity that is consistent with reproduction is inherently moral.83  More 
recently, several other prominent scholars have made important contributions 
to the natural law literature and have applied their analysis to many of the same 
fraught legal issues.84 
Another legal scholar whose work should be mentioned, since it also draws 
on the natural law tradition, is Mary Ann Glendon.  Glendon has figured 
prominently, both as a scholar and as a representative of the Catholic Church 
in United Nations meetings on international human rights.  Although much of 
her best-known work is not explicitly theological in orientation, it is closely 
related to her more theologically inflected writing on human rights.85  Both 
draw on comparative law perspectives and argue against the tendency in 
American law to think narrowly in terms of individual rights. 
Glendon’s most recent work on international religious freedom is part of a 
vibrant recent literature on international human rights, much of it anchored in 
the Catholic natural law literature and inspired by the writings of Maritain and 
Murray.  Prominent new contributions include work by Michael Perry and 
others.86  This work has already had a profound influence on the international 
debates about human rights. 
Crucial to these scholars’ effectiveness has been their direct engagement 
with the leading mainstream secular jurisprudence.  The best of the new natural 
 
 83 See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 
1069–70, 1076 (1994) (defending laws designed to discourage homosexual activity). 
 84 Among the leading contemporary natural law theorists are Robert George, a student of Finnis’s, and 
Russell Hittinger, who applies a more traditional Thomist perspective.  See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN 
DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999); ROBERT P. GEORGE, NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY (1996); 
RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: RE-DISCOVERING NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN AGE (2003); 
RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987).  Although neither George nor 
Hittinger is a law professor, both write on jurisprudential and legal issues. 
 85 Glendon is most famous for her book, MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
LEGAL DISCOURSE (1991), and related work on family law and on the nature of Constitutional rights. 
 86 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 
(2007); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 97 (2005); 
MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
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law theorists have debated contemporary legal and jurisprudential questions in 
terms with which their nonreligious peers are familiar.  The new natural law 
jurisprudence also has the virtue of offering specific, contestable positions on 
at least some particular legal issues, such as the debates over abortion and gay 
rights, noted above. 
B. Christian Lawyering and Legal Ethics 
The second niche where genuine Christian legal scholarship can be found is 
in a small but vibrant literature on Christian lawyering and Christian legal 
ethics that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s.  For several decades, a 
handful of Christian legal scholars have explored how the Christian faith might 
affect a lawyer’s perspective on law practice and the legal profession.87 
The Christian lawyering scholars are intellectual magpies, drawing from an 
eclectic mix of sources and traditions.  As one commentator puts it: 
Readers [of the leading Christian lawyering scholar] encounter neo-
orthodox and narrative theology, biblical studies; the nineteenth 
century novel of manners and sensibility (especially Trollope); 
material from film, stage and television; the deviance theory of Kai 
Erikson; the history and sociology of later immigrant cultures in 
America; C.P. Snow and C.S. Lewis; Martin Buber’s understanding 
of I-Thou relations; the history of British and American legal-ethical 
concepts.88 
The common threads that tie these materials together are narrative and the 
belief that lawyering should be viewed in its social context, rather than as a 
series of isolated, individual decisions. 
Much of the Christian lawyering literature has been influenced by the 
theology of John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas, who have insisted on 
 
 87 The wellspring of much of the literature was Thomas Shaffer, who has written numerous books and 
dozens of articles and directly inspired most of the other leading scholars.  Probably his best-known book is 
THOMAS SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981); for extensive commentary on his work, see 
First Annual Journal of Law and Religion Award Ceremony, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 277–366 (1993–94).  Other 
leading scholars, each of them deeply influenced by Schaffer, include Bob Cochran, Joseph Allegretti, Milner 
Ball, and Emily Hartigan.  See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Introduction: Can the Ordinary Practice of Law 
be a Religious Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373 (2005); JOSEPH C. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING: 
CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1996); MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993); Emily 
Hartigan, Surprised by Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 147; see also HOWARD LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD: 
RELIGION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT (1998). 
 88 Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers be Saved? The Theological Legal Ethics of Thomas Shaffer, 10 J.L. & 
RELIGION 347, 347 (1993–94). 
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the communal nature of Christianity and the centrality of the church.  Echoing 
this theme, the leading Christian lawyering scholar insists: “Faithfulness to the 
tradition of Israel and of the Cross means that the lawyer stands in the 
community of the faithful and looks from there at the law.”89  Like the “trial 
lawyers of American fiction,” he argues, lawyers should “live and suffer 
through the pain of their clients, those who are guilty and those who are not.”90  
Lawyers should also strive to develop the kinds of virtues reflected in these 
fictional heroes, such as civility, self-possession, judgment, and diffidence.  
They must not, however, come to worship the law itself.  The lawyer’s 
“community of memory,” her church or synagogue, is primary; the law is 
secondary.91 
The Christian lawyering scholars do not speak with a single voice, of 
course.92  But they are few enough, and the literature is cohesive enough, to 
permit us to generalize about its focus and significance.  Rather than 
emphasizing particular legal issues, with the prominent exception of the nature 
of the professional responsibility rules, the Christian lawyering scholars are 
most concerned with how lawyers should view the practice of law.  The 
abiding question, to borrow a phrase, is “how to live, what to do.”93  To 
explore this question, the Christian lawyering scholars have immersed 
themselves deeply in a variety of secular literatures.  As a result, the best of the 
 
 89 THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 198 (1991). 
 90 SHAFFER, supra note 87, at 73.  “William Faulkner’s lawyer, Gavin Stevens,” Shaffer writes by way of 
illustration, “has his most extensive exposure as a trial lawyer in the Intruder in the Dust, a murder defense 
which is not about the administration of justice in Mississippi but is about the relationship between an 
establishment white lawyer and an unfortunate old black man.”  Id. at 73–74.  In To Kill a Mockingbird, and 
its portrayal of Atticus Finch’s heroic but unsuccessful rape-trial defense, “the message—the sense of the story 
and the point it has to make—turns on the barrenness of dealing with people outside human relationships.”  Id. 
at 74. 
 91 The temptation to idolatry of law also figures prominently in the writings of William Stringfellow, 
another important influence on Shaffer.  “To ignore for a moment that law itself is part of creation,” Frank 
Alexander writes in a survey of writings by and about Stringfellow, “and thus apart from the Grace of God, is 
to permit the law to become an idol unto itself, a substitute for grace.”  Frank S. Alexander, Book Review, 16 
J.L. & RELIGION 762, 772 (2001). 
 92 A good illustration of a familial dispute among Christian lawyering scholars was Shaffer’s effort to 
rehabilitate the concept of the gentleman lawyer.  Although Shaffer is mindful of the sexist, class-bound 
legacy of the gentleman lawyers of the past, he believes their virtues remain relevant today.  Compare 
SHAFFER, supra note 87, chs. 2–4, with Milner S. Ball, Out of the West Rides an Unmasked Stranger . . ., 10 
J.L. & RELIGION 339, 340 (1993–94) (characterizing himself as “wary of [Shaffer’s] romance with 
gentleman’s ethics”). 
 93 Wallace Stevens, How to Live. What to Do, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 125 
(1954).  For an article that takes up this question in the large law firm setting, see Amelia J. Uelman, Can A 
Religious Person Be a Big Firm Litigator?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1069 (1999). 
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Christian lawyering literature has been both deeply and distinctively Christian 
and potentially relevant to scholars who would not characterize themselves as 
Christian. 
C. First Amendment and Church-State Issues 
We come now to the literature most often associated with the term 
Christian legal scholarship: First Amendment and church-state issues.  Not 
surprisingly, the First Amendment has exerted a magnetic attraction on 
Christian legal scholars.  Issues such as school prayer, state funding of 
sectarian schools, and the creationism-evolution debate necessarily implicate 
religion.  For scholars who wish to be taken seriously in academic circles, but 
who also wish to explore issues touching directly on religion, church-state 
issues are the obvious choice.  Although these scholars often kept their faith in 
the background in the 1950s and 1960s, several wrote from a recognizably 
Christian perspective.94 
In the current generation, the brightest star has been Michael McConnell.95  
Starting in the 1980s, McConnell unleashed a trenchant historical and 
theoretical critique of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  
McConnell’s principal theme is equal treatment.  Given the pervasive infusion 
of the government into all aspects of life since the advent of the administrative 
state, he argues that drawing a sharp line between government and religion 
unfairly discriminates against religion.96  The government should not favor 
religion, but neither should churches and religious organizations be excluded 
from benefits available to other, nonreligious institutions.  On this view, 
organized school prayer cannot be squared with the Establishment Clause, but 
a voucher program that parents can use for religious as well as secular schools 
 
 94 Two of the most prominent in this regard were Wilbur Katz and Paul Kauper.  See, e.g., WILBER G. 
KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964); Wilbur G. Katz, Responsibility and Freedom: A 
Difficulty in Relating Christianity and Law, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 269, 269 (1953) (“Possibly I exaggerate out of a 
wish to believe that most professors with religious convictions are like me in being at a rudimentary stage in 
integrating their religion with their respective fields.”); Paul G. Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A 
Review, 52 MICH. L. REV. 829 (1954). 
 95 Steven Smith has also figured prominently.  See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and 
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). 
 96 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at 5, 21 (“As the domain of government increases in scope, government 
involvement in religious activity becomes necessary if religious exercise is to be possible at all. . . .  That is 
why the old paradigm of ‘strict separation’ under the Establishment Clause has had to give way to such ideas 
as ‘equal access,’ ‘neutral funding,’ and ‘accommodation.’”). 
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is neutral and should be permitted.  Other Christian scholars have developed 
alternative positions, some calling for more governmental accommodation.97 
The second branch of church-state scholarship addresses the broader issue 
of religion and public decisionmaking.  Should citizens and lawmakers be 
permitted to invoke their religious views as a reason for supporting or 
opposing legislation?  Can judges rely on their religious views to help resolve 
hard cases?  Although the debate goes back much further, it took on particular 
urgency in the 1980s, when prominent Christian intellectuals decried the 
exclusion of religion from the public square.98  This controversy attracted 
widespread scholarly attention after the philosopher John Rawls proposed that 
citizens should “bracket” their religious views and exclude them from political 
debate because these views are not subject to rational scrutiny and cannot be 
interrogated by those who do not share the religious beliefs.99 
The suggestion that religious believers set their religious beliefs aside drew 
immediate and sustained critique.  Critics pointed out the implausibility of 
bracketing one’s beliefs and the risk that precluding citizens from invoking 
their beliefs would force religious believers to disguise the real basis for their 
views, thus discouraging candor in public debate.  Over the past two decades, 
several prominent Christian legal scholars have attempted to develop 
alternative conceptions of the proper role of religion in public decisionmaking. 
The two leading Christian legal theorists distinguish between the use of 
private convictions as a ground for decision, on the one hand, and in public 
deliberation, on the other.100  Each suggests that “ordinary citizens should feel 
free to rely on convictions informed by religious and other similar views when 
they consider difficult political issues.”101  But in public discourse, politicians, 
 
 97 Other key scholars include Bob Tuttle and Thomas Berg.  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006); Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion 
Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (2004). 
 98 The most important legal scholar sounding these themes was Stephen Carter, who reached a huge 
audience through his influential book The Culture of Disbelief, his law review articles, and his commentary in 
the popular press.  See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
 99 Rawls maps out this position (in infinitely more nuanced fashion) in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM (1993) and a number of scholarly articles. 
 100 The discussion that follows foregrounds the work of Kent Greenawalt and Michael Perry, each of 
whom has written extensively about these issues.  See also Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989).  For an important recent contribution outside of the legal literature, see 
generally CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002). 
 101 KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 7 (1995). 
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judges, and other decisionmakers should steer clear of arguments based on 
religion wherever possible.  According to Kent Greenawalt, they can properly 
rely on their personal convictions only on exceptional occasions.102  In all other 
cases, they should identify “publicly accessible” reasons for their 
decisionmaking.  Michael Perry would allow a wider scope for religion.  
“Because of the role that religiously-based moral arguments inevitably play in 
the political process,” he argues, “it is important that such arguments, no less 
than secular moral arguments, be presented in public political debate, so that 
they can be tested there.”103  But he contends that decisionmakers should 
“forgo reliance” on religious arguments unless they can identify “an 
independent secular argument” that points in the same direction, and which 
they find persuasive.104  In response to the two theories, still another Christian 
scholar, echoing the position held by many theologically conservative 
Christians outside the academy, has argued for a much less restrained role for 
religion.105 
D. Christian Legal History 
The final habitat where Christian legal scholarship can be found is legal 
history.  The deepest vein of this work is connected to the church-state 
literature and explores the relationship between religion and the Constitution 
and other foundational documents of the Republic.106 
Other legal historians have reached even further back in time, but with 
work that has either implicit or explicit relevance to the relationship between 
 
 102 Id.; see also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). 
 103 Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); see also 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003); MICHAEL J. PERRY, 
RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997) [hereinafter RELIGION IN 
POLITICS]. 
 104 Perry, supra note 103, at 20.  Perry retrenches somewhat, proposing that a secular justification is not 
always necessary, in RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 103. 
 105 David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response 
to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991).  For a useful summary of the literature, with particular 
reference to judicial decisionmaking, see generally Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The 
Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709 (2004). 
 106 One of the classics in this genre, though not written from a Christian perspective, was published 
(interestingly) by Mark DeWolfe Howe in the mid 1960s.  MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE 
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).  More recent 
exemplars include JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 
2005); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).  Sally Gordon also has written 
important historical work on the Religion Clauses.  See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON 
QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002). 
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Christianity and modern American law.  The pioneering work of contemporary 
Christian legal scholarship, The Interaction of Law and Religion, developed a 
historically based argument that law and religion are inextricably 
intertwined.107  Another fine legal historian has brought a Christian perspective 
to bear on, among other things, the evolution of laws on marriage and 
divorce.108  Although the historical work often seems more influential with 
historians than with legal scholars, it is distinctly legal in focus and is likely to 
become increasingly important if the scope of Christian legal scholarship 
continues to expand. 
E. What Counts as Christian Legal Scholarship? 
Some readers may object to my four categories as too stingy a reckoning of 
the current state of Christian legal scholarship.  It is indeed true, as these 
readers will point out, that law reviews have published many articles that 
feature an identifiably Christian perspective, but do not fit into any of the 
categories we have considered.  These articles are not, however, the basis for a 
serious body of Christian legal scholarship.  To see why, we should briefly 
consider the two most important kinds of articles that have been excluded. 
The first are articles that use a Biblical passage or person to explore a legal 
issue.  The articles in this genre have usually been inspired by the law and 
literature movement.  In one strand of law and literature, sometimes referred to 
as “literature as empathy,” scholars use a literary text to explore a legal issue or 
legal dilemma.109  The text may itself have a discernibly legal theme (as in 
 
 107 BERMAN, supra note 28.  Berman, whose scholarly reputation initially rested on his work on Soviet 
law during the Cold War, subsequently wrote a sweeping historical account of the relationship between 
religious upheaval and secular legal reform.  See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: 
THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003); HAROLD J. 
BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW 
AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). 
 108 See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN 
THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997); FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN 
LIFE (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2005); see also JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: 
THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION (2002); JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S 
JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (2006).  Witte, a professor at Emory, and his late 
colleague Berman are the best known of the modern Christian legal historians.  Witte (together with Frank 
Alexander) runs the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, which was established in 
1982 and is the most prominent law and religion institute. 
 109 The various modes of law and literature scholarship are labeled and analyzed in Jane B. Baron, Law, 
Literature, and the Problem of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059 (1999).  There is a lively debate over 
whether law and literature qualifies as a genuine “movement,” or whether it is congeries of somewhat related 
scholarly works.  In my own view, it is (or was) a movement, but not an entirely coherent one. 
SKEEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/12/2008  2:24:13 PM 
2008] CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1503 
Kafka’s stories and novels) but often does not (as with Mark Twain’s 
Huckleberry Finn).  Some scholars, often Christian scholars, have taken 
Biblical passages as their texts.110  The classic article in this genre uses the 
parable of the Prodigal Son to explore the Supreme Court’s cases on 
desegregation and institutional housing for the mentally handicapped.111  If the 
relationship between the Biblical passage and the legal issue is simply 
illustrative—that is, the analysis does not seriously engage the passage in 
theological terms or treat it as having normative force—these articles are not 
Christian legal scholarship at all.112  Nor, on the other hand, is an article that 
does not engage the secular legal scholarship in any meaningful way.113  
Although some of this literature clearly does qualify, the genre is too thin, at 
least thus far, to constitute a separate category of Christian legal scholarship. 
The second exclusion is a closer call.  An increasing number of scholars 
have provided “Christian critiques” of prominent movements in, and modes of, 
legal scholarship.  Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought is a rich vein of 
this work, with chapters on “Reinhold Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory,” “A 
Christian Response to Liberal Feminists,” and “Law and Economics: An 
Apologia.”114  The usefulness of work in this genre is sometimes limited by the 
authors’ failure to master the literature being critiqued, much as Christian 
attacks on postmodernism are often undermined by the critic’s unfamiliarity 
with leading postmodern thought.115  But even the more sophisticated critiques 
must be put to one side.  The reason for exclusion can be summed up in the 
adage, “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”  To offer a meaningful Christian 
critique of Critical Legal Studies or Critical Race Theory, a scholar must first 
 
 110 I include myself among those who have written in this vein.  See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Saul 
and David, and Corporate Takeover Law, in LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 151 (Paul Heald ed., 
1998) (using Biblical accounts of Saul and David to analyze the Delaware Supreme Court’s hostile takeover 
cases). 
 111 Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984). 
 112 I view my own contribution as right on the borderline, but probably qualifying as Christian legal 
scholarship. 
 113 Many of the articles in nonscholarly Christian publications have this quality, explicating a biblical 
passage without addressing, even indirectly, the scholarly literature on the issue. 
 114 Davison M. Douglas, Reinhold Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 18, at 149; Teresa Stanton Collett, Independence or Interdependence? A Christian Response to Liberal 
Feminists, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at 178; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: 
An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at 208. 
 115 I hasten to add that none of the articles just cited suffer from this shortcoming.  Bainbridge, for 
instance, has written extensively and well from within the law and economics perspective.  See generally 
Steven M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); 
STEVEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002). 
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develop a Christian theory of law against which the legal movement will be 
measured.  The normative Christian account would certainly qualify as 
Christian legal scholarship, and the critique of other prominent legal 
movements would serve as applications of the underlying theory.  But the 
existing critiques usually skip the first step.  They do not outline a theoretical 
(or in many cases, a theological) baseline that can be meaningfully challenged, 
questioned, or applauded.  They provide the application without the theory 
itself, dessert without the dinner. 
The discussion thus far suggests a simple test for Christian legal 
scholarship.  Christian legal scholarship must satisfy two criteria.  First, it must 
provide either a normative theory derived from Christian scripture or 
tradition116 or a descriptive theory that explains some aspect of the influence of 
Christianity on law, or of law on Christianity.  The first touchstone, in other 
words, is an identifiably Christian account of what ought to be, or what is.  
Second, it must seriously engage the best secular scholarship treating the same 
issues. 
Each of the four areas considered earlier meets this test.  The new natural 
law and the Christian lawyering literature develop deeply Christian normative 
accounts of law and lawyering.  The work of the Christian legal historians is 
generally descriptive rather than normative, attempting to identify and explain 
the influence of Christianity on legal change.  In the church-state literature, one 
finds both normative and descriptive theory at work, at times in the same 
article.117  The “equal access” thesis of church-state relations, to give the most 
obvious example, is defended both as the historical understanding of the 
Religion Clauses and as a normative theory of the proper stance of the state 
toward religion. 
 
 116 The best work in this vein will of course reflect serious theological reflection as well as legal expertise.  
See, e.g., William Brewbaker, Who Cares? Why Bother? What Jeff Powell and Mark Tushnet Have to Say to 
Each Other, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 533, 556 (2002) (reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18 (“[I]f 
Christian perspectives are to provide a distinctive voice, Christian scholars must have a theologically informed 
understanding of the relationship between Christian faith and the structure of the most important currents of 
contemporary thought.”)). 
 117 It is important to note that some of the doctrinal First Amendment scholarship by Michael McConnell 
and others would constitute Christian legal scholarship as defined in this Article, but some would not.  
McConnell’s historical account of the treatment of religion prior to the enactment of the First Amendment is 
descriptive Christian scholarship, for instance, whereas some of his other work on First Amendment issues 
does not draw in any direct way on Christian scripture or tradition, and does not offer a descriptive account of 
Christian influence. 
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With respect to the second requirement, the theoretical contributions in the 
four areas have not been made in a scholarly vacuum.  The leading scholars 
also are deeply engaged with the best secular work being done by their peers, 
as vividly illustrated when Michael McConnell was nominated for a judgeship 
on the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2001.  Although McConnell’s 
views on church-state relations and abortion are controversial, more than three 
hundred law professors signed a letter supporting his nomination.118  The new 
natural law scholars, Christian lawyering scholars, and legal historians have 
not been singled out quite so publicly, but they are equally engaged in the 
scholarly conversation in their fields. 
One last nagging question remains.  The criteria for Christian legal 
scholarship outlined here focus on the scholarship, not the scholar herself: 
must one identify herself with a Christian tradition to contribute to Christian 
legal scholarship?  In practice, scholars who seek to develop an identifiably 
Christian normative analysis, or who explore the intersection of Christianity 
and law, will usually be drawn by personal as well as scholarly commitment.  
Moreover, those who hold Christian beliefs may ask questions about the 
interaction between Christianity and law that other scholars are less likely to 
ask.119  This suggests a close correlation between Christian belief and Christian 
legal scholarship.  But this does not mean that Christian belief is a prerequisite 
for Christian legal scholarship.  The key factor for scholarly purposes is the 
nature of the scholarship itself.120 
 
 118 “McConnell’s scholarly work has been path-breaking and influential,” the letter read.  “It has also been 
characterized by care, thoroughness, and fairness to opposing viewpoints. . . .  Some of us have disagreed with 
McConnell on constitutional issues and undoubtedly will disagree with him again.  All of us, however, hope 
that the Senate will confirm Professor McConnell.”  Professor Albert Alschuler & Professor Michael Heise, 
Correspondence to Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (July 9, 2001), 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060114234721/http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ 
michaelmcconnellsupportletter.htm; see also Cass R. Sunstein, A Conservative Nominee Liberals Should Love, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at A20 (“McConnell qualifies, simultaneously, as one of the nation’s top law 
professors and one of its top lawyers—superb preparation for the federal bench.”). 
 119 For a similar point about historical analysis, see MARSDEN, supra note 22, at 64–65 (discussing, 
among other illustrations, work on the history of American Puritanism by Charles Hambrick-Stowe and 
suggesting that “[o]nly a Christian, I think, is likely to take questions about piety as seriously on their own 
terms as Hambrick-Stowe does”). 
 120 A superb recent example is Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 60, which predicts, based on the declining 
anti-Catholic animus in American life and the proliferation of non-Catholic private schools, that the Supreme 
Court will be increasingly open to allowing funding to religious schools but will continue to prohibit Bible 
reading and school prayer.  I do not believe that Jeffries or Ryan would identify themselves as Christians.  I 
would nevertheless characterize their article as Christian legal scholarship. 
SKEEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/12/2008  2:24:13 PM 
1506 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57 
F. The Dearth of Christian Legal Scholarship 
In the four areas previously discussed, conditions are favorable for 
Christian legal scholarship.  But these areas cover only a tiny portion of legal 
scholarship.  Even the most visible area, church-state relations, rarely occupies 
more than two or three classes in a constitutional law course.  There is a 
general pattern to the scattered outposts of Christian legal scholarship.  Each 
draws on philosophy, history, or both.  But when it comes to other 
methodologies or legal issues outside the four we have considered, one finds 
very little in the American legal literature.  Despite the vast recent literature on 
public choice and comparative institutional analysis, for instance, legal 
scholars have not developed general Christian theories about the proper role of 
law and legal institutions.  Pathbreaking recent work has been done on 
immigration, debt relief, and poverty—all of which would seem to have 
obvious relevance for a scholar steeped in Christian scripture, yet each is 
largely untouched by Christian legal scholarship.121  What might a less 
cloistered, more robust Christian legal scholarship look like?  This question 
will occupy the final two Parts of the Article. 
III.  THE RULE OF LAW AND NORMATIVE CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
The first of the roads not taken is to develop a normative Christian theory 
of the proper role of the law generally, or of a particular area of law, drawing 
not so much on moral or political philosophy as on economics, sociology, or 
political science.122  A little over a hundred years ago, the Dutch theologian 
and politician Abraham Kuyper did precisely this.  His example suggests what 
a general Christian theory of law might look like.123  The discussion that 
 
 121 There are a few scattered exceptions.  See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Who is My Neighbor?: An Essay 
on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1587 (1997). 
 122 In the theological literature, a small group of theologians developed a normative theory in the 1970s 
that enjoyed a brief burst of notoriety.  Variously known as Christian Reconstructionism, Theonomy, and 
Dominion Theology, these theologians argued for a direct re-implementation of the legal framework of the 
Hebrew Bible in contemporary America.  The key figures include John Rousas Rushdoony, Greg Bahnsen, 
and Gary North.  See, e.g., ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, THE INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL LAW (1973); GREG L. 
BAHNSEN, THEONOMY IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1977).  The zenith of Christian Reconstructionism is well past, 
but it still attracts at least some attention in Evangelical circles, as well as shivers of disapproval from 
outsiders.  Theonomy never had a discernible impact on the legal scholarship, and has not engaged the secular 
legal or jurisprudential literature in any sustained way.  For theological critique, see, for example, THEONOMY: 
A REFORMED CRITIQUE (William Barker & W. Robert Godfrey eds., 1990). 
 123 I am not the first to note that Kuyper’s work is both relevant and underutilized.  See, e.g., Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at 486. 
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follows argues that Kuyper would be an obvious starting point for developing a 
Protestant Christian perspective on law, then outlines another possible 
normative Christian theory of law. 
A. Kuyper’s Sphere Sovereignty 
Kuyper began his career as a Calvinist pastor in a rural Dutch church in the 
late 1860s.124  He subsequently pastored churches in Utrecht and Amsterdam; 
started a newspaper, to which he contributed columns for decades; created a 
political party; helped found the Free University in Amsterdam and served as a 
theology professor thereafter; was twice elected to the Second Chamber in the 
Dutch Parliament; and capped off his political career by winning a term as the 
nation’s Prime Minister from 1901 to 1904.  The theme that ran through all of 
these endeavors was God’s sovereignty, or as Kuyper himself famously and 
more emphatically put it: “Oh, no single piece of our mental world is to be 
hermetically sealed off from the rest, and there is not a square inch in the 
whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign 
over all, does not cry: “Mine!’”125  Kuyper’s own label for the normative, 
Christian theory of politics and law he proposed was “sphere sovereignty,” 
which he defined in an 1880 speech inaugurating the Free University as an 
outworking of the sovereignty of Christ in the world.  “This perfect 
Sovereignty of the sinless Messiah,” he argued, “at the same time directly 
denies and challenges all absolute Sovereignty among sinful men on earth, and 
does so by dividing life into separate spheres, each with its own sovereignty.”  
He then elaborated on the nature of these spheres: 
Our human life . . . is so structured that the individual exists only in 
groups, and only in such groups can the whole become manifest. . . .  
[T]he circumference of each [sphere] has been drawn on a fixed 
radius from the center of a unique principle, namely, the apostolic 
injunction hekastos en toi idioi tagmati [“each in its own order”: 1 
Cor. 15:23].  Just as we speak of a “moral world,” a “scientific 
world,” a “business world,” the “world of art,” so we can more 
properly speak of a “sphere” of morality, of the family, of social life, 
 
 124 For an excellent introduction to Kuyper and his thought, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper 
(1837–1920), in THE TEACHINGS, supra note 20, at 288.  For a sampling of Kuyper’s most important writings, 
see ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM (1931) (reprinted 1994); ABRAHAM KUYPER: A 
CENTENNIAL READER 461, 467 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998). 
 125 Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM KUYPER: A CENTENNIAL READER, supra note 124, at 488. 
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each within its own domain.  And because each comprises it own 
domain, each has its own Sovereign within its bounds.126 
The state, too, is a sphere, but it differs from the other spheres in a critical 
respect.  Whereas the family or church or community organization is organic, 
the state is “mechanical.”  The other spheres would exist and develop 
organically even in a more perfect world.  The state, by contrast, is necessary 
only because of our fall into sin through Adam and Eve.  The state’s role is to 
restrain sin, but the state must not interfere with the other spheres; it must not, 
in Kuyper’s more vivid metaphor, “become an octopus which stifles the whole 
of life.”127  Only in three circumstances, he argued, may the state encroach on 
the other, more organic spheres: (1) to compel mutual respect of boundary 
lines when the spheres clash; (2) to defend individuals and weak ones against 
the abuse of power within a sphere; and (3) to ensure that each citizen helps to 
bear the personal and financial burdens necessary to maintain the unity of the 
state.128 
Kuyper’s conception of sphere sovereignty, which bears an obvious and 
oft-noted resemblance to the Catholic concept of subsidiarity,129 suggests a 
relatively limited role for the state and has obvious implications for legal 
doctrine.  State and local regulation presumably is to be preferred over 
nationwide oversight, and intervention into the family and other organic 
spheres can only be justified under limited circumstances. 
More a visionary than a systematic scholar, Kuyper did not fully develop 
either his definition of “spheres” or the implications of the sphere-sovereignty 
thesis.  Subsequent Dutch theorists attempted to draw out its implications, and 
a few more recent theologians and historians have underscored its potential 
relevance for today.130  But the use of his work in contemporary American 
 
 126 Id. at 467. 
 127 KUYPER, supra note 124, at 96. 
 128 Id. at 97. 
 129 See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 123, at 486 (noting the similarities and contrasts between sphere 
sovereignty and subsidiarity, which dates back to Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum); Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 895 n.197 (1997) (noting similarities). 
 130 Kuyper’s best known follower is the Dutch Philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd.  Dooyeweerd 
developed an elaborate philosophical system that distinguished among fourteen categories of spheres.  (One 
application of this system was the Free University itself, which had fourteen floors, one for each sphere, with 
theology on top.)  Dooyeweerd’s work is briefly summarized in David S. Caudill, Law and Belief: Critical 
Legal Studies and Philosophy of the Law-Idea, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at 109, 119–24.  
See also Johan David van der Vyver, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, at 
xi (Johan David van der Vyver & John Witte eds. 1996) (providing a succinct discussion of sphere sovereignty 
and Dooyeweerd’s contributions). 
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legal scholarship has tended to be more impressionistic than sustained, and 
Christian legal scholars have not employed it as a base camp for a sustained 
normative account.131  Here, it would seem, is an opportunity.  A theory that 
married Kuyper’s insights with, say, the sophisticated understanding of 
institutions and decisionmaking biases provided by contemporary public 
choice theory and behavioral economics might go a long ways toward filling 
the current vacuum in normative Christian legal scholarship. 
B. Christianity and the Double Game of Law 
Having briefly considered Kuyper’s theory of sphere sovereignty, this 
section briefly sketches an alternative theory.132  The theory bears a family 
resemblance to Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty, although it was not devised with 
Kuyper in mind. 
Start with the foundation in the Christian Scriptures.  If we wish to develop 
a Christian theory of the proper role of civil and criminal liability, what key 
scriptural principles should serve as our guide?  One can imagine a variety of 
principles, but two seem particularly central.  First, we are created in God’s 
image.133  This theme, which is sounded in the very first chapter of the Bible 
and continues through the prophets and into the New Testament, suggests that 
each one of us deserves to be treated with dignity, male as well as female, the 
poor as well as the rich.  The second theme is sin.  Although each of us is made 
in God’s image, every one of us is inherently sinful.  “[A]ll have sinned and 
fall short of the glory of God,” as the Apostle Paul writes in his letter to the 
Romans.134 
These two themes, together with Jesus’s dramatic reconceptualization of 
the nature of law, have important implications for thinking about the role of 
 
 131 I hasten to add that several recent articles drawing on Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty may foreshadow 
the kind of sustained treatment that the literature so far lacks.  See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 123. 
 132 This theory was first developed in my coauthored work with William Stuntz and also draws on earlier 
work by Stuntz.  See David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 809 (2006); Stuntz, supra note 19, at 1733–40; William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1871 (2000).  For recent critiques of the theory, see, for example, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The 
Bible, Positive Law, and the Legal Academy, in 8 THE BIBLE AND THE UNIVERSITY 161 (David Lyle Jeffrey & 
C. Stephen Evans eds., 2007); John M. Breen, Modesty and Moralism: Justice, Prudence, and Abortion—A 
Reply to Skeel & Stuntz, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2008). 
 133 See, e.g., Genesis 1:27 (English Standard Version) (“So God created man in his own image, / in the 
image of God he created him; / male and female he created them.”). 
 134 Romans 3:23. 
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law.135  Because we all are prone to sin, law is necessary.  Otherwise, chaos 
would engulf us, just as surely as it engulfs the boys stranded on an isolated 
jungle island in Lord of the Flies.136  But human law cannot possibly police 
every sin.  When Jesus teaches in the Sermon on the Mount that anger is a 
form of murder and to lust is to commit adultery,137 he underscores the 
pervasiveness of God’s law.  But an obvious secondary implication is that 
human law must have more modest aspirations.  Liability rules that attempt to 
stamp out every sin simply magnify the discretion of regulators and 
prosecutors.138  Not only are regulators and prosecutors unable to enforce such 
sweeping liability, but they, unlike God, are sinful themselves.  As a result, 
extensive discretion invariably translates to discriminatory enforcement, to an 
abandonment of the principle that each of us should be treated with equal 
dignity.  A properly designed legal system must thus play a double game: it 
should restrain the worst wrongs of the citizenry, but at the same time not give 
unbridled discretion to regulators and prosecutors. 
The classic example of legislation that failed to heed these principles is 
Prohibition.  The Constitutional prohibition of manufacturing or selling alcohol 
was a great legislative victory for those who believed that drinking was 
immoral.139  But a sweeping ban on alcohol could not possibly be enforced in 
systematic fashion.  Very quickly, a disturbing pattern emerged.  The 
proprietor of an establishment that sold beer in a working class Irish or Italian 
neighborhood in New York City might well wind up in jail; those who sold gin 
in an upscale, upper East Side neighborhood were far more likely to wind up in 
an F. Scott Fitzgerald novel.  The discriminatory enforcement bred disrespect 
for Prohibition, and ultimately undermined the very moral norm against 
drinking that Prohibition was meant to reinforce.140 
Many of the prominent culture war issues fit a similar pattern.  
Evangelicals have waged a decades-long battle against Roe v. Wade.141  Yet 
 
 135 For a fascinating exploration of the distinctions between Jesus’ and a rabbinic conception of law, see 
Chaim Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 97 (2007). 
 136 WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954). 
 137 See, e.g., Matthew 5:21–22 (“You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not murder; 
and whoever murders will be liable to judgment.’  But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother 
will be liable to judgment.”); Matthew 5:27–28 (lust is adultery). 
 138 See, e.g., discussion of Prohibition, infra note 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 139 In addition to Evangelicals, the coalition that campaigned for Prohibition included liberal Protestants 
and others.  The temperance movement is recounted in detail in FOSTER, supra note 9. 
 140 See Stuntz, supra note 132, at 1877–78 . 
 141 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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one of the great ironies of the abortion wars is that the side that has the law 
behind them loses ground in the courtroom of public opinion.  In the 1960s, 
when abortion was illegal in much of the country, Newsweek and Life ran 
gruesome stories about deaths from back alley abortions, and abortion rights 
sentiments were in the ascendancy.  Since Roe v. Wade, the more salient image 
of abortion is the gruesome procedure anti-abortion advocates call partial birth 
abortion.142  With closely contested social issues, the temptation to use the 
legal system to lock in one side’s position is almost irresistible, but it often 
backfires.143 
The dangers of drifting away from rule-of-law values are not confined to 
evangelicals and culture war issues.  Because Congress tends to criminalize 
each new form of misbehavior that seizes public attention, federal criminal law 
has expanded to a breadth that could never be fairly or systematically enforced.  
The metastasis of federal criminal law can be traced in part to the institutional 
dynamic of lawmaking.  Lawmakers know the laws will rarely be enforced, 
which makes criminal prohibition a cheap way to take a stand against the acts 
of highly publicized miscreants.  Moreover, lawmakers face powerful 
pressures to cast their lot with advocates of criminalization.  A lawmaker who 
votes “yes” can portray herself as tough on crime with little risk that the vote 
will come back to haunt her.144  If anyone is punished for a hopelessly 
overbroad criminal statute, it will be those who enforce it, not the lawmakers 
who enacted it.  A lawmaker who votes “no,” by contrast, is sure to be tarred 
as soft on crime as soon as she comes up for reelection.145 
Is this pattern inescapable?  Courts could nibble away at the federal 
criminal code by drawing on common law doctrines such as desuetude, which 
is sometimes used to invalidate provisions that are invoked after having 
gathered dust for years.146  But desuetude would not cover laws that are in fact 
 
 142 The Supreme Court recently upheld a federal law ban on partial birth abortion.  See Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 143 For a discussion of similar tendencies in the enforcement of gambling laws, see David A. Skeel, Jr., 
When Markets and Gambling Converge, in THEOLOGY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (Charles Cohen & Leonard 
Kaplan eds., forthcoming 2008); David A. Skeel, Jr., A Channeling Approach to Gambling and Market 
Speculation (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 144 The dynamic outlined in the text is described in William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal 
Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2565 (2004). 
 145 The civil liability system is subject to similar pressures, but has more checks than the criminal law.  
When lawmakers propose sweeping new civil liability, they invariably face pushback from interest groups that 
will be exposed to liability under the new law. 
 146 For discussion of the desuetude doctrine, citations to the case law, and an argument for the doctrine’s 
revitalization, see Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209 (2006). 
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applied, but are wielded arbitrarily or in discriminatory fashion.  A more 
complete solution would require Congress to step in and tie its own hands.  
Imagine a federal statute that declared any criminal or civil provision invalid if 
it is not systematically and consistently enforced.147  Under such a rule, a 
defendant like Martha Stewart could invoke the new rule if she were charged 
under a rarely used law and ask that the provision be declared invalid.  In 
effect, this strategy would hardwire the modest rule-of-law approach into the 
criminal and civil justice framework.  A law that legislators enacted to restrain 
the misbehavior of the citizenry would endure only if it could be and was 
systematically enforced, thus limiting the potential for abuse by prosecutors 
and regulators. 
C. The Perils of Symbolic Lawmaking 
The modest rule-of-law perspective assumes that laws need to have 
consequences.  Lawmakers worry too little about consequences when they 
criminalize the latest form of misbehavior because they are held accountable 
only for their initial vote.  To appreciate the dangers of symbolic lawmaking in 
other contexts, consider a prominent recent proposal for reshaping the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses. 
In Divided by God, Noah Feldman contends that the Supreme Court has 
been too stingy about permitting public religious discourse and too 
accommodating when it comes to state funding of religious institutions.148  To 
remedy this imbalance, Feldman argues that the Court should “offer greater 
latitude for public religious discourse and religious symbolism, and at the same 
time insist on a stricter ban on state funding of religious institutions and 
activities.”149  Posting the Ten Commandments and stamping “in God we 
trust” on coins would be fine under this proposal; school vouchers that could 
be used for religious schools would not.  “Such a solution,” Feldman 
concludes, “would both recognize religious values and respect the institutional 
separation of religion and government as an American value in its own 
right.”150 
 
 147 See David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Faith, Law and Morals, Lecture at Fordham Law School 8 
(May 10, 2005) (on file with author). 
 148 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD 
DO ABOUT IT 237 (2005). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
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Feldman’s symbols-but-no-money proposal is clever and lucid, a powerful 
blast of fresh air.  The theory defended here suggests, however, that 
theologically conservative Christians and others who find the modest rule-of-
law thesis persuasive should have serious reservations.  From the modest rule-
of-law perspective, symbols-but-no-money gets things exactly backwards. 
Many of the concerns with public religious symbolism are well known.  
State endorsed religious symbols may be experienced as oppressive by 
outsiders.  Of particular concern from the modest rule-of-law perspective, 
however, are the effects on Congressional lawmaking.  Because symbolic laws 
do not have tangible consequences, lawmakers are too quick to enact them.  
The same institutional pressures that lead to criminalization of the latest 
misbehavior also can make symbolic religious legislation irresistible. 
The dangers of symbolic religious legislation are particularly stark in the 
current political environment, in which evangelical Christians have been a 
large and cohesive constituency within the Republican Party, much as unions 
once were for the Democrats.151  An intriguing new model of political decision 
making suggests that the existence of a well-defined constituency that 
comprises nearly half of the populace invites strategic extremism.152  If one 
party can gain more votes from the constituency than it loses from those who 
hold opposing views, the argument goes, the party will send extreme messages 
to curry favor with the constituency in question.  These messages will not be 
limited to symbolic issues.  Indeed, the principal current illustration is 
abortion, which is the subject of both symbolic and very real lawmaking.153  
But symbolic issues—think of the debates over the Ten Commandments, the 
Pledge of Allegiance, and Terri Schiavo—lend themselves particularly well to 
strategic extremism and have exacerbated the sharp polarization in current 
American politics. 
A money-but-no-symbols approach to church-state issues, by contrast, 
might force lawmakers to devote more of their energy to laws with real 
 
 151 For an interesting recent illustration of the tensions this can create in evangelical churches, see Laurie 
Goodstein, Disowning Conservative Politics, Evangelical Pastor Rattles Flock, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at 
A1 (describing reaction to megachurch pastor when he preached a series of sermons suggesting that the 
“church should steer clear of politics”). 
 152 Edward L. Glaeser et al., Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious 
Values (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion Paper No. 20444, 2004). 
 153 As evidence of strategic extremism, Glaeser and his colleagues track the evolution of the parties’ 
presidential platforms.  The Republican platform has become more doctrinaire pro-life with each presidential 
election cycle, while the Democratic platform has evolved in the opposite direction.  Id. 
SKEEL GALLEYSFINAL 6/12/2008  2:24:13 PM 
1514 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57 
consequences.  Rather than the size and location of a Ten Commandments 
plaque, the salient debate for theologically conservative Christians might 
become whether to direct money to school vouchers or to strengthen the social 
safety net.  These are issues with real consequences, which do not lend 
themselves to the cynical lawmaking that so often characterizes the politics of 
symbolic legislation.  They also are issues on which theologically conservative 
Christians themselves hold divergent views.  If the question is whether to 
direct scarce budget dollars to welfare or to school choice, evangelicals and 
other theologically conservative Christians might part ways and even part 
parties.  A political landscape in which evangelicals could be found in both 
parties, rather than just one, might be a healthier political landscape.154 
D. Conclusion 
The normative theory sketched out here is only one possible Christian 
perspective on the proper role of the secular law.155  One can imagine other, 
very different Christian approaches both to the legal system generally and to 
particular legal issues.  There is a somewhat Kuyperian flavor to aspects of the 
modest rule-of-law perspective, for instance, but Kuyper was more 
sympathetic to explicit governmental endorsement of religious symbols than 
the theory developed in this part.  A deeply Kuyperian approach also might 
center more directly on family, church, and other intermediate institutions. 
Each of these illustrations is distinctively Protestant in emphasis.  A 
Catholic approach might draw on the Catholic social and economic tradition 
that has developed over the last century.  The most likely antecedents are 
Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray, whose theological and political 
writings deeply influenced the thawing of the church’s hostility toward 
democracy and its important pronouncements on religious freedom and human 
rights after World War II.  There are, in fact, early hints of just such a 
development.  Drawing on the Second Vatican Council’s 1965 Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, for instance, one scholar has begun to develop a theory of 
the proper scope of morals legislation that would preclude regulation on issues 
such as sexual behavior unless the regulation could be justified as necessary to 
 
 154 For a brief application to the debate over evolution and intelligent design theory, see David Skeel, Op-
Ed., How School Vouchers Might Help Religion-Science Debate Evolve, PHILA. INQ., Apr. 16, 2006, at C7. 
 155 John Nagle’s work on environment law issues offers another.  See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, 
Christianity and Environmental Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 18, at 435 (applying Christian 
principles to environmental law). 
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“public order.”156  Several other scholars have recently applied Catholic Social 
Thought to corporate governance.157 
Although most American Christians are either Protestant or Catholic, one 
also can imagine similar work from an Orthodox perspective.158  The important 
thing is that this work be undertaken.  A true Christian legal scholarship would 
marshal the resources of Christian Scripture and tradition for a normative 
analysis of law and legal institutions that engages the best and most innovative 
secular scholarship in law and other disciplines. 
IV.  TOWARD A NEW DESCRIPTIVE CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE 
BONO PUZZLE 
In current American politics and lawmaking, few questions are as visible 
and hotly contested as the influence of religion in general, and of evangelical 
Christians in particular.  The debate over America’s culture wars has coursed 
through the opinion journals since James Davison Hunter’s famous 1991 book 
gave the controversies over abortion, gay rights, and other social issues a name 
and definition.159  The most recent lightening rod was a controversial exit poll 
suggesting that twenty-two percent of Americans in the 2004 presidential 
election cast their vote based on moral values issues.160 
Scholars in a variety of disciplines have begun to explore the implications 
of these developments in earnest.  Political scientists are developing models 
 
 156 Gregory Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 38–42 (2006) (applying this principle to the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of a Texas anti-sodomy law in Lawrence v. Texas, and concluding that 
Kennedy’s majority opinion and O’Connor’s concurrence were consistent with the principle, but Scalia’s 
dissent was not).  See also Gregory A. Kalscheur, John Paul II, John Courtney Murray & the Relationship 
Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. 
CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 231 (2004). 
 157 Susan Stabile argues for regulatory intervention in corporate law to promote the common good.  Steve 
Bainbridge has interpreted the same principles as counseling deference to corporate managers.  For a summary 
and critique of the debate, with citations to the leading contributions, see Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions 
of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought (Villanova Univ. School of Law Working Paper Series, 2004), 
http://works.bepress.com/mark_sargent/2. 
 158 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea Bargaining System, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1425 (2003) (arguing for reform of the plea-bargaining system from an Orthodox 
perspective). 
 159 JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991). 
 160 See, e.g., Dick Meyer, How Story of 2004 Election Hinged on One Exit Poll, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 
2004, at B5, B5 (noting that twenty-two percent of voters answered “moral values” to the question “Which one 
issue mattered most in deciding how you voted for president?”). 
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attempting to explain Christian voters and the politicians who court their 
votes.161  Sociologists have used polling data to assess the culture wars 
divide.162  They also have conducted important qualitative work on the re-
engagement of evangelicals over the past thirty years.163 
The opportunities for legal scholarship that draws on these insights are 
evident.  The political science and sociology scholarship is a rich source of 
information on voting attitudes and their political ramifications.  What it does 
not yet explain is the mechanism by which these attitudes are translated into 
legislative and judicial decisionmaking.  Do Christian churches or non-church 
organizations figure prominently, or can the influence be traced to prominent 
leaders like James Dobson or Chuck Colson?  Or is it simply the implicit clout 
of millions of Christian votes?  Why do many evangelical initiatives fail?  A 
Christian legal scholarship that drew on the new political science and 
sociological literature, and on a lawyerly familiarity with the legal process, to 
explore the mechanisms of Christian influence would be a valuable scholarship 
indeed. 
As with the normative Christian scholarship considered in the last part, 
very little of this more descriptive Christian legal scholarship currently exists.  
This Part begins by considering an exception to the scholarly void: the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.  I then offer an additional 
example of descriptive Christian legal scholarship.  The example comes not 
from the culture wars, but from the international movement for debt relief and 
sovereign bankruptcy.  In Europe, the Christian organization Jubilee played a 
prominent role.  In the United States, by contrast, the principal influence has 
been a complicated (and complicatedly) Christian rock star named Bono. 
 
 161 See, e.g., Glaeser et al., supra note 152 (studying the effect of religious influences on voting patterns); 
Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer, Persuasion in Politics, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 435, 435 (2004) (developing 
model that starts from the assumption that there is mutual persuasion within a network of people who hold 
similar views, and that this can “be ‘rented out’ to politicians”); cf. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH POOLE & 
HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006) 
(developing model of ideological preference and presenting evidence that Christian voters do not vote against 
their economic interests nearly to the extent pundits suggest). 
 162 See, e.g., James L. Guth et al., Religious Coalitions in American Politics, BOOKS & CULTURE, Nov.–
Dec. 2005, at 32 (presenting poll data confirming existence of culture wars divide and questioning revisionist 
literature doubting the existence of serious polarization in American life). 
 163 See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH 
SINCE WORLD WAR II 173–214 (1988) (examining the growth of a national movement of evangelical voters 
since World War II). 
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A. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
In 1998, Congress enacted a rather remarkable piece of legislation known 
as the International Religious Freedom Act.  The Act, which was several years 
in the making, established a new governmental Office on International 
Religious Freedom in the State Department, to be headed by an Ambassador-
at-Large for religious freedom.  The Act also created a new Commission on 
International Religious Freedom and added an additional adviser on 
international religious freedom at the National Security Council.  In addition to 
its ad hoc advisory functions, the Office on International Freedom is required 
to issue an annual report assessing the state of religious freedom in every 
foreign country and explicitly identifying those that violate religious 
freedom.164 
The political dynamics of the Act have been chronicled in a small but 
illuminating literature.165  Two facets of the debate stand out.  The first is the 
unlikely coalition that pushed for legislative intervention.  The most sustained 
lobbying came from Michael Horowitz, a Jew for whom contemporary 
religious persecution spurred memories of the Holocaust, together with 
evangelical Christian groups alarmed by increasing reports of religious 
persecution in many parts of the world.166  These groups allied with human 
rights activists, many of whom were seasoned, resolutely secular campaigners 
for international human rights.  Pope John Paul II’s frequently expressed 
concerns about religious persecution, and the long Catholic tradition of support 
for human rights, added further ballast to the campaign.  It was a fractious 
coalition, undercut at times by tensions and false steps (including a 
pronouncement by Pat Robertson that violent Liberian leader Charles Taylor 
 
 164 For an overview of the basic contours of the Act, see, for example, T. Jeremy Gunn, A Preliminary 
Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 BYU L. REV. 841, 843–44.  
The legislation has generated controversy, in part because of the evangelical influence on its enactment and in 
part because it makes the U.S. a moral arbiter of religious freedom in the rest of the world.  Compare Peter G. 
Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral 
Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (2002) (criticizing U.S. unilateralism), with Gunn, supra 
(defending the legislation). 
 165 Most directly relevant is a book by political scientist Allen Hertzke, which chronicles the political 
process that led to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, with a particular emphasis on the role of 
evangelicals.  ALLEN D. HERTZKE, FREEING GOD’S CHILDREN (2004); see also ALLEN D. HERTZKE, 
REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON 179–85 (1988) (discussing the influence of the evangelical lobby upon 
congressional policymakers). 
 166 See, e.g., David Aikman, Compassionate Bedfellow, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Feb. 2007, at 122 (tracing 
evangelical involvement to a 1996 meeting convened by the National Association of Evangelicals and noting 
that the meeting “had been sparked not by an evangelical, but by a Jew, Michael Horowitz, whose knowledge 
of Christian persecution came from an Ethiopian refugee living in his house”). 
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should be supported as a good Christian); but it successfully countered 
opposition from business groups and initial skepticism in the Clinton 
Administration. 
Equally striking was the nature of the evangelical influence.  Because 
evangelical Protestant churches are generally nonhierarchical, and there is no 
established church in the U.S., the religious freedom debate was shaped more 
by entrepreneurial individuals and nonchurch organizations than by a church 
leadership structure.167  A cluster of Christian organizations, such as Christian 
Solidarity International, continuously pressed for intervention.  Two prominent 
activists, Nina Shea and Paul Marshall, wrote books whose titles hint at the 
urgency and at times sensationalism of their appeals: In the Lion’s Den and 
Their Blood Cries Out.168  Finally, several Christian lawmakers adopted 
religious persecution as a signature issue and served as point persons in 
Congress.169 
This pattern of decentralization is the key to understanding American 
evangelicalism and the mechanisms of its political influence.  It is thrown into 
even starker relief by the debt relief movement, due to the striking differences 
between religious influence in Europe, as compared to the U.S. 
B. Debt Relief and the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt 
The movement described as “debt relief” consists of several interrelated 
concerns.  The first, which supplies the label, is the campaign to cancel the 
debt of impoverished nations.  Usually this envisions voluntary relief by a 
country’s creditors, but it may also comprise the use of international or 
domestic law to prevent creditors from collecting what they are owed.  Much 
of the lobbying undertaken by Bono, as well as the 2005 Live 8 concert and 
 
 167 The more theologically liberal, mainline Protestant churches have denominational lobbying 
organizations, but they were somewhat wary of the proposed legislation and played a less prominent role in its 
enactment.  For a helpful analysis of the national offices of the mainline churches, see Laura R. Olson, 
Mainline Protestant Washington Offices and the Political Lives of Clergy, in THE QUIET HAND OF GOD, supra 
note 9, at 54. 
 168 NINA SHEA, IN THE LION’S DEN: PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND WHAT THE WESTERN CHURCH CAN DO 
ABOUT IT (1997); PAUL MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD CRIES OUT: THE WORLDWIDE TRAGEDY OF MODERN 
CHRISTIANS WHO ARE DYING FOR THEIR FAITH (1997). 
 169 Virginia Congressman Frank Wolf and New Jersey Congressman Chris Smith were two of the key 
players.  Allen D. Hertzke & Daniel Philpott, Defending the Faiths, 61 NAT’L INTEREST 75 (2000).  Wolf, 
along with Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, cosponsored the International Religious Freedom Act in 1997.  
See James T. Richardson, Public Policy Toward Minority Religions in the United States: A Model for Europe 
and Other Countries?, in RELIGION & SOCIAL POLICY 20 (Paula D. Nesbitt ed., 2001). 
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work of British musician Bob Geldof, has been aimed at debt relief.170  The 
other issue is sovereign debt restructuring.  Here, the principal debate has been 
whether to establish a formal debt restructuring mechanism such as a sovereign 
bankruptcy framework—that is, bankruptcy provisions designed for financially 
troubled countries.  Unlike with debt relief, which involves the poorest nations 
(think Africa), most of the beneficiaries of sovereign debt restructuring are 
middle-income nations (Latin America, Russia, Asia) that have significant debt 
repayment capacity but have encountered a financial crisis. 
On both issues, the Christian voice can be traced to the work of a 
nongovernmental organization called Jubilee.  Jubilee, which now has 
branches in more than sixty countries, began in England in the 1990s.  It was 
conceived in a British pub by Martin Dent, a seventy-five-year-old retired 
professor and great-great-great-grandson of an eighteenth-century British 
Christian abolitionist.  “Dent knew that the Old Testament calls for jubilee 
every 50 years,” according to one account: 
[A] fresh start for slaves and debtors.  Linking that Leviticus teaching 
to the coming of the millennium, he figured, might goad politicians 
and galvanize the public.  In 1996 Dent and Bill Peters, a retired 
British ambassador, dubbed the quest Jubilee 2000.171 
The movement quickly caught fire in England.  Rallies in Birmingham in May 
1998 drew an estimated 50,000 people, and by November 27, 2000, the 
Guardian described Jubilee 2000 as “comfortably the most successful mass 
movement of the past 25 years.”172  These efforts helped goad the G7 nations 
 
 170 See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, Musical Cry to Help Africa’s Poor Is Heard at Concerts Around Globe, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A8 (describing the ten Live 8 concerts, which were “intended to send a loud message to 
the leaders of the Group of 8 industrial nations before their meeting”).  Bono and Geldof also have been 
involved in the campaign to increase aid to impoverished nations, often drawing attention to crises such as the 
malaria and AIDS epidemics in Africa.  See Press Release, Debt AIDS Trade Africa (“DATA”), G8’s Africa 
Agenda in Crisis (June 6, 2007), available at http://www.data.org/news/press_20070606.html (discussing 
Geldof’s and Bono’s involvement in the effort to fight poverty and AIDS in Africa).  Strictly speaking, these 
efforts involve aid rather than debt relief, but the movements are closely connected. 
 171 Dennis R. Hoover, What Would Moses Do? Debt Relief in the Jubilee Year, RELIGION IN THE NEWS, 
Spring 2001, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172 Quoted in id. at 16.  The well-known British evangelical theologian (now Bishop) N.T. Wright added 
his voice to the choir in a lecture later published as The Millennium Myth.  N.T. WRIGHT, THE MILLENNIUM 
MYTH: HOPE FOR A POSTMODERN WORLD (1999).  Wright described debt relief as the signature issue of our 
time.  “There is no reason in the world’s terms,” he wrote, “why one should cancel debts.  If you have people 
in your power, why not keep them there?  Debt cancellation is inexplicable in terms of Marx, Nietzsche or 
Freud . . . .  It is a sign of hope, of love, of the gospel.”  Id. at 108. 
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to adopt a $34 billion debt relief plan in 2000.173  The campaign for a 
sovereign bankruptcy framework has not yet succeeded, but it has achieved 
several lesser victories, and Jubilee continues to argue for a restructuring 
framework.174 
In the United States, the picture could hardly have looked more different.  
Whereas visitors to London in the late 1990s were surrounded with headlines 
about Jubilee, and saw graffiti urging England to “Drop the Debt, not Bombs,” 
the debt relief movement was nearly invisible in the U.S.  There were no mass 
rallies or marches on Washington.  Few Americans, Christians or otherwise, 
were familiar with the Bible-inspired efforts of Jubilee.  If assessments of the 
debt-relief movement in England “erred on the side of triumphalism,” as one 
commentator put it, “most of the U.S. coverage erred on the side of 
indifference.”175 
Why such radically different reactions on opposite sides of the Atlantic?176  
One possible explanation is that the starkest need is in Africa, which has long 
been more salient to the British than to Americans.  Africa is more 
geographically proximate to Britain, and England’s colonial empire created 
lasting ties to the continent that are evident in everything from the substantial 
numbers of African immigrants in the U.K., to the coverage of the BBC 
evening news.  A related explanation is that Americans simply are not 
interested in international news.  If the legacy of England’s colonialism is a 
 
 173 See, e.g., Jeff M. Sellers, How to Spell Debt Relief, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 21, 2001, at 64, 64 
(describing planned $34 billion in debt relief for twenty-two countries in 2000).  The G-7 is a loose affiliation 
of the seven leading developed economies: the U.S., the UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Canada.  The 
G-8 is these countries plus Russia.  For an overview and history, see LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING 
SOVEREIGN DEBT 24–27 (2003). 
 174 Responding to a sovereign bankruptcy framework proposed by the International Monetary Fund, 
Jubilee’s research department wrote: “For us, any international insolvency practice should operate under a 
‘framework of justice, accountable to the people of the debtor nation, as well as all creditors.’ . . .  [A better 
proposal would ensure] an independent, fair and transparent process that would genuinely serve to bring 
justice and reasons into international finance.”  Romilly Greenhill, IMF Meetings Give Go-Ahead for 
Bankruptcy Plan—But on Whose Terms?, JUBILEE RES., Oct. 1, 2002, available at http://www.jubileeresearch. 
org/analysis/articles/imf011002.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).  For a critique of the Jubilee, IMF and other 
proposals, and an alternative proposal, see Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Time to Rethink Sovereign 
Bankruptcy: A New Role for the IMF?, in SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY (Joseph Stiglitz & Jose Ocampo eds., 
forthcoming 2008); Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign 
Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2003). 
 175 Hoover, supra note 171, at 16. 
 176 My thanks to the students in my fall 2005 Debt Relief and Sovereign Debt Restructuring class for 
insights into this question.  The analysis in this paragraph draws on our extensive class discussions on the 
puzzling divergence in responses to the debt relief campaign. 
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sense of connection to the wider world, the longstanding tendency of U.S. 
isolationism continues to influence American reading and viewing patterns. 
Both theories are plausible and seem likely to be part of the explanation.  
But at least as important is still another factor: the radically different nature of 
Christian influence in the two countries.  In England, most evangelicals, like 
most nonevangelical Christians, are part of the state church, the Church of 
England.  English evangelicals also tend to be comfortable with an active state 
role in addressing social issues such as the need for poor relief.177  It is no 
accident that Tony Blair, the representative of the socially liberal Labor Party, 
attracted substantial evangelical support in each of his election campaigns (as 
one suspects will current Prime Minister Gordon Brown).  The debt-relief 
movement chimed perfectly with each of these qualities: it benefited from 
strong ties to the established church and found a receptive audience in British 
Christians who were already concerned about social issues. 
In America, evangelicalism looks very different.  Although evangelicals 
campaigned vigorously for governmental intervention on social issues 
throughout the nineteenth century, they were extremely wary for most of the 
twentieth, as we have seen.  With the important and unhappy exception of 
Prohibition, evangelicals steered clear of social issues, which they associated 
with the liberal Protestantism of the Social Gospel.  American evangelicals did 
not deny the ubiquitous concern in the Bible for the poor and oppressed.178  
But they treated this as secondary to the message of salvation, and preferred 
private, voluntary efforts to address poverty rather than government 
intervention.179 
In America, as in England, the debt-relief campaign proceeded according to 
form.  Working through their Washington offices, the mainline Protestant 
churches aligned themselves with Jubilee and championed debt relief early on, 
much as they have advocated other social issues.  But debt relief barely 
registered as an issue within the more politically influential evangelical circles.  
The combination of a general lack of interest in poverty outside America’s 
borders, and the inability of mainline American churches to generate grassroots 
 
 177 See, e.g., BEBBINGTON, supra note 1, at 263–67 (describing resurgence in English evangelical social 
activism since the 1960s). 
 178 The prominent liberal evangelical Jim Wallis often illustrates the pervasiveness of Scripture 
admonitions about poverty by brandishing a Bible from which all the references to poverty and the oppressed 
have been cut out.  The Bible is in tatters.  See, e.g., JIM WALLIS, GOD’S POLITICS (2004). 
 179 This was the tendency Carl Henry criticized when he insisted on the need for an evangelical social 
policy.  HENRY, supra note 51, at 76. 
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support made any serious intervention on debt relief unlikely.180  Shifting the 
political dynamic in the U.S. would require a transformation of evangelical 
resistance to social reform.  Or to use the terminology of the literature on social 
norms: a norm entrepreneur.181 
This seems to have been what the Irish rock star Bono provided.  Bono’s 
role in the campaign for debt relief dates back to 1997, when he was given 
briefing materials authored by Jamie Drummond of Jubilee.  Drummond’s 
brief, as a Time magazine cover story recounts, “pointed out that although [the 
1995 benefit conference] Live Aid raised $200 million, Ethiopia alone paid 
$500 million in annual debt service to the world’s lending institutions.  After 
contacting Drummond, Bono signed on as a spokesman for Jubilee 2000.”182  
Since then, he has made debt relief a signature theme, both in his personal 
appearances and for his band, U2.183 
Bono’s influence has taken two forms, each aimed in important part at 
evangelicals.  First, he directly appealed to key politicians.  In 1999 and 2000, 
he crisscrossed the Atlantic to lobby leading Congressional leaders.  A key 
breakthrough came in 2000, when Bono met with former North Carolina 
Senator Jesse Helms.  Recounting the wrenching human tragedy he had seen in 
Africa, and appealing to the Biblical mandate to assist the poor, Bono brought 
Helms to tears.  Previously a staunch opponent of assistance for Africa, Helms 
 
 180 See, e.g., Lestur Kurz & Kelly Goran Fulton, Love Your Enemies? Protestants and United States 
Foreign Policy, in THE QUIET HAND OF GOD, supra note 9, at 364, 373–76 (describing “wide participation of 
[mainline] Protestants in Jubilee 2000”); NOREENA HERTZ, THE DEBT THREAT: HOW DEBT IS DESTROYING 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD 4 (2004) (noting that “despite the support of various religious groups, the Jubilee 
Coalition had almost no profile” in the U.S.). 
 181 Robert Ellickson argues that norm entrepreneurs are most effective when they have a significant 
technical knowledge, and “there are appreciative experts . . . who are likely immediately to esteem the norm 
entrepreneur for trying to change the social practice at issue.”  Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social 
Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy (Yale Law Sch. Program for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. 
Policy, Working Paper No. 230, 1999); see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution 
of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2108–18 (2001) (applying 
Ellickson’s insights to erosion of norm against hostile takeovers in Japan). 
 182 Josh Tyrangiel, The Constant Charmer, TIME, Dec. 26, 2005, at 55. 
 183 U2’s most recent album includes a powerful, Biblically based musical plea for debt relief and aid to 
developing nations.  “You speak of signs and wonders,” the chorus runs, “But I need something other / I would 
believe if I was able / But I’m waiting on the crumbs from your table.” U2, Crumbs from Your Table, on HOW 
TO DISMANTLE AN ATOMIC BOMB (Interscope Records 2004).  The phrase “crumbs from your table” comes 
from a parable in Luke 16.  The parable describes a wealthy man who was merciless to a poor man named 
Lazarus while both were alive.  When the rich man begs Abraham (who is in heaven with Lazarus) for help, 
Abraham recounts how the rich man had denied Lazarus even the crumbs from his table.  On one reading, the 
song links America and other wealthy nations with the rich man who was reluctant to use his riches to assist 
those in need. 
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agreed to end his interference.184  Bono’s entre to the Bush Administration was 
speechwriter Michael Gerson, who reportedly heard about a speech Bono gave 
at Wheaton College, the evangelical college from which Gerson graduated and 
to which he retains close ties.185  “Gerson and Budget Director Josh Bolton are 
evangelical Christians who believe there’s a biblical imperative to help the 
world’s poor,” the Time story noted.  “Along with then National Security 
Advisor Condoleeza Rice, they opened a dialogue with Bono and ultimately 
persuaded Bush to meet him.”186 
Bono’s second, less-well appreciated, source of influence is the mass 
audience he can tap through the DATA organization and the One campaign 
that U2 promotes at each of its concerts.187  The One campaign email list 
includes hundreds of thousands of names.  The mailing list is, in effect, a large 
grassroots constituency that can be mobilized in the time it takes to send an 
email message.  Indeed, the effective constituency is even larger than the email 
list, including thousands of others who are familiar with Bono’s initiatives but 
have not joined the list.  This substantial grassroots constituency, much of it 
evangelical, is the backdrop against which Bono’s conversations with national 
leaders take place.188 
Although much of Bono’s press has been laudatory—including his 
selection as co-winner of Time’s person of the year award in 2005—he also has 
taken flack for his political efforts.  “I’m surprised Bono can still talk,” the 
Irish singer Sinead O’Connor has been quoted as saying, “his mouth is so full 
 
 184 According to Bobby Shriver, who has worked extensively with Bono in Washington, 
Bono connected to [Helms] in a spiritual way.  The two talked about the vast gulf between 
Africa’s misery and America’s prosperity.  About the Bible, children, and so forth.  And Helms 
was very moved by Bono’s sincerity and evident knowledge.  Not only in terms of Scripture, but 
in terms of the financing.  He said he would come on board. 
Quoted in HERTZ, supra note 180, at 17.  The episode is also recounted in James Traub, The Statesman: Why, 
and How, Bono Matters, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 18, 2005, at 86 (recounting how Senator Helms “listened, 
and his eyes began to well up” as Bono quoted Scripture and told him that “women and children were dying of 
AIDS . . . and governments burdened by debt couldn’t do a thing about it”). 
 185 Gerson’s role in the Bush administration is profiled in Jeffrey Goldberg, The Believer: George W. 
Bush’s Loyal Speechwriter, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 56–57. 
 186 Tyrangiel, supra note 182, at 57; see also Traub, supra note 184. 
 187 DATA stands for Debt AIDS Trade Africa.  The website, www.data.org, posts updates about debt, 
trade and health issues related to Africa, often including stories about or messages from Bono.  The One 
campaign is the grassroots campaign to address these issues. 
 188 See, e.g., David Brooks, A Natural Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005, at A29 (“Bono, who is a 
serious if nonsectarian Christian, is at the nexus of a vast alliance between socially conservative evangelicals 
and socially liberal N.G.O.’s.”). 
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of American politician cock.”189  But the results are remarkable.  Under his 
prodding, Congress agreed to forgive $435 million of African debt at the end 
of the Clinton administration.  Bono’s efforts figured prominently in the Bush 
administration’s $15 billion Millennium Challenge initiative and in the U.S. 
representatives’ agreement to sign on to a $50 billion debt relief program under 
the auspices of the G-8 nations in 2005.190 
It is too early to tell whether the debt-relief campaign will genuinely 
transform the stance of American evangelicals on social issues.  The norms 
literature suggests that norm transformation is most likely when the new norm 
is more efficient than the norm it displaces.191  Evangelicals’ resistance to 
activism does not neatly map onto this literature, since it is not obvious that the 
evangelical stance is driven by rational financial calculation.192  There is an 
intriguing analogy, however, that may warrant further exploration.  
Evangelical reluctance to support intervention has long created cognitive 
dissonance within American evangelicalism, given the repeated Biblical 
injunctions to attend to the poor,193 but the stance has endured due to the 
historical factors described at the outset of this section (most importantly, the 
reaction to the perception that the Social Gospel movement abandoned the 
redemptive role of Christianity).  If the quiescence norm is shifting, at least on 
the issue of debt relief, the shift can be seen as a move to a more cognitively 
consistent norm—a norm that is efficient in the functionalist sense that it 
creates less friction with evangelicals’ ostensible commitment to the authority 
 
 189 Michael Odell, The Q Interview, Q. MAG., 2005, at 63, 64. 
 190 In a joint appearance with Bono in 2002, President Bush joked about Bono’s influence, saying “Bono, 
I appreciate your heart and to tell you what an influence you’ve had, Dick Cheney walked into the Oval Office, 
he said, ‘Jesse Helms wants us to listen to Bono’s ideas.’”  Press Release, White House, President Proposes $5 
Billion Plan to Help Developing Nations: Remarks by the President on Global Development (Mar. 14, 2002) 
(on file with author), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020314-7.html. 
 191 See, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 181 (discussing the relative efficiencies of norms and legal rules).  
Norms also appear to be sticky until they near a tipping point.  See, e.g., Randal Picker, Simple Games in a 
Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (testing 
norm shifts with computer simulations). 
 192 On the other hand, recent empirical evidence casts some doubt on the common assumption that 
evangelicals regularly vote against their economic interests.  See, e.g., MCCARTY, POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra 
note 161 (finding that the voting patterns of people who regularly attend church fairly closely track their 
economic status). 
 193 Evangelicals’ failure to make poverty a central concern has been a longstanding lament of liberal 
evangelicals.  See, e.g., RONALD J. SIDER, RICH CHRISTIANS IN AN AGE OF HUNGER (1977) (discussing the 
tension between the Biblical view of wealth and the political attitudes of many evangelical Christians toward 
the problem of poverty); WALLIS, supra note 178; BALMER, supra note 12, at 171 (noting that more American 
children have been living below the poverty line since George W. Bush took office). 
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of scriptural teaching.  In this sense, the norm transformation would parallel 
the shift from an economically inefficient to an efficient norm. 
CONCLUSION 
The principal explanation for the dearth of Christian legal scholarship 
appears to be a form of historical path dependence.  Religion was dismissed by 
American legal scholars for much of the twentieth century, its “brooding 
omnipresence” deemed irrelevant to serious legal scholarship.  Evangelicals 
returned the favor by deserting America’s political and scholarly life.  
Although evangelicals re-engaged American political life in the 1970s, the 
skepticism of religious perspectives, and the absence of a critical mass of 
Christian legal scholarship, lingered.  There is now a substantial interest in 
Christian legal scholarship, but surprisingly little scholarship to turn to. 
While the tone of much of this Article has been pessimistic, there is a silver 
lining: the paucity of Christian legal scholarship seems unsustainable.  With 
significant numbers of self-identified Christians in positions of prominence, 
and substantial Christian influence in American politics and law, there is a 
pent-up demand for both normative and descriptive Christian legal scholarship.  
The formation in the past decade or so of several new law schools dedicated to 
pursuing a distinctively Christian vision of legal studies, including Catholic 
laws schools such as Ave Maria and St. Thomas and Regent on the Protestant 
side, is perhaps a forerunner of this trend.194  More recently, Catholic legal 
scholars have begun applying Catholic Social Thought in a variety of 
contexts.195  There is evidence of a similar though as yet more limited ferment 
from the Protestant perspective.  It is still much too early to tell if this new 
scholarly activity will have a sustained impact on legal scholarship generally, 
or on internal debate within Christian circles.  But it might.  In ten years, or 
possibly even five, this Article’s laments may come to seem quaint.  I pray this 
is so. 
 
 194 A few more longstanding law schools, such as Villanova, also have begun to focus more intensively on 
religiously oriented scholarship.  See Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the 
Dean in an Inclusive Catholic Law School, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 171, 179–87 (2001) (describing vision of law 
school as neither sectarian nor secular in orientation). 
 195 See supra Part III.D.  Perhaps the most vibrant current venue for debate about legal issues is the 
Catholic website Mirror of Justice, http://www.mirrorofjustice.com, which provides ongoing commentary and 
debate on legal and political issues. 
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